

Civil War, Brigade Series:

Barren Victory

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Introduction

Barren Victory is the fourth game of the **Civil War, Brigade Series**. It examines the events of September 19th and 20th, 1863—The Battle of Chickamauga. This action was one of the few in the Civil War where the South actually outnumbered the Federals. The battle was closely fought and the game recaptures the spirit of the struggle for victory. With two maps and numerous minor options, the variant play possibilities are extensive.

1.0 Terrain and Map Notes

1.1 The Turn Record Track is used to record the passage of time during the game. A marker is used on one track to record the time, while another is placed on a second track to record the particular day. The first and last few turns of daylight have a single number in the time box which indicates the visibility in hexes for that turn. Night turns are indicated by the shading on the turn record track.

1.2 The Entry Hexes, used for the arrival of reinforcements, and for map exit in some cases, are marked with a single red letter. For instance, entry hex A corresponds to hex B1.01. If a reinforcement's entry hex is blocked by enemy units, the reinforcement may enter in any hex free of enemy units at or within 10 hexes of the scheduled hex.

1.3 The Artillery Ammunition Tracks, one provided to each player, uses three markers each to record the expenditure of artillery ammunition for each army. The markers, (x100, x10, x1) record the amount of ammunition remaining in hundreds, tens, and ones respectively. Starting amounts are given in each scenario.

1.4 The Loss Record Tracks, one provided to each player, also use three markers each to record the losses (in casualties only, not stragglers) for each army. The markers (x100, x10, x1) record the current number of losses in each army. Each time a side receives one or more casualties, advance the marker by one space for each.

1.5 The Hex Numbering System is used to identify individual hexes on either map. The two maps are marked A (the North map) and B (the South map). The digit(s) of the hex number before the decimal indicates the number of the hexrows running north-south, counting from west to east. For instance, 1.xx is the Western-most hexrow on each map. The digits after the decimal indicate the precise hex within the given hexrow, counting upwards from the south end of each map. The first hex in each row is numbered xx.01. Furthermore, not every hex number is printed on the map. Each fifth hex in each row is numbered, (xx.05, xx.10, xx.15, etc.) creating gridlines to follow. For instance, to find hex A29.17, follow the gridline of xx.15 on map A until you find hex A29.15, then count north two hexes.

1.6 Forest and Woods Hexes. In a change from earlier games, the much dreaded (and hard to see) forest dot has been eliminated. Any hex that is 1/2 or more forest symbol is forest, otherwise it is woods. When in doubt, roll a die to settle the issue. No quibbles about map edge hexes—count only the *printed* hex area when determining 50% or more.

2.0 Union Special Rules

2.1 Acting Army Commanders

Before Rosecrans' arrival on the field, *No Union Corps commander assumes temporary Army command*. If Rosecrans becomes a casualty, the highest ranking surviving corps commander takes command of the army. This order is:

1. Thomas
2. Crittenden
3. McCook
4. Granger

2.2 Union Anti-Initiative Ratings

There are no army or corps level anti-initiative ratings for any Union leader.

2.3 Plus Weapons Units

All Union cavalry units and the Wilder Brigade are considered to have "+” weapons and are so marked. There are no other plus weapons units in this game.

2.4 Attachments and Detachments

The Union player may freely attach and detach divisions between his three army corps (14th, 20th, & 21st) with the following restrictions. No corps may have more than two divisions attached or detached at any time during the game. The Res and Cav Corps may *detach* units to other commands, but may never *attach* divisions. Cavalry brigades may be attached or detached as above, but count as a division in such cases. All such reassignment details are conducted during the command phase.

2.5 Wilder's Mounted Infantry Brigade

The unit designated Wldr/4/14 is Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, actually 1/4/14; detached, armed with Spencer repeating rifles, and mounted to strengthen the army's weak cavalry arm. The status of this unit is independent, as historically it acted with a lot of operational freedom. No other unit, Union or Confederate, is considered independent in the game. (Exception: see Scenario 5.)

2.6 The Separate Brigade

The 2/2/Res unit is the only brigade of its division on the field (in the historical game). This unit is treated as a division of one brigade, and may never be

attached to another division. This unit traces command radii directly to the Corps HQ, just as if it were a divisional leader. In certain optional situations, the rest of the division may be present, in which case the unit functions normally.

2.7 The Reserve Corps Supply Wagon

The Reserve Corps supply train carried an extensive amount of small-arms ammunition, and was used to resupply much of the 14th Corps after the rout of the rest of the army. In the game, the Res Corps supply wagon carries an unlimited amount of ammunition, and may resupply any Federal unit. In effect, it serves the same function as the army supply train, including being used for tracing the line of supply of Union artillery. Note that if both the army train and the Res train have exited or are eliminated, Federal batteries fire at half strength per the series supply rules.

3.0 Confederate Special Rules

3.1 Acting Army Commanders

If Bragg becomes a casualty, the highest ranking surviving Corps commander takes command of the army.

The order of rank of the various commanders is:

1. Polk
2. Longstreet
3. D.H. Hill
4. Buckner
5. Walker
6. Hood

Note: Longstreet does not take command until he arrives. In the interim, the next man in line takes command.

3.2 Anti-Initiative Ratings

Unlike Rosecrans' force, Bragg's Army of Tennessee was riddled with dissension and ill feeling. Indeed, all of the corps and divisional commanders in the Confederate army were convinced to some extent that Bragg was unfit to command. Only Longstreet, fresh from the relatively congenial atmosphere of the Virginia army, still believed Bragg was capable. This opinion was soon to be altered. In light of this amazing distrust, the following anti-initiative ratings are in effect for the Confederates.

Between Bragg and the following

corps commanders:

Polk, Walker -1
 Longstreet 0
 All other corps or
 acting corps commanders -2

Only one corps commander, Polk, has an anti-initiative of his own to be applied to his division commanders, and it is -1.

3.3 The Confederate Command Structure

At the start of the game, the Army of Tennessee is organized into 5 infantry and 2 cavalry corps, encompassing fifteen divisions. In the middle of the battle, Bragg took the highly unusual step of reorganizing his command structure to accommodate the arrival of Longstreet, creating two wings under Longstreet and Polk, the next highest ranking corps commander. Normally regarded by military historians as a dangerous move, Longstreet's ability to assimilate the situation, create an effective plan, and establish communications with his scattered troops in the middle of the night paid off, as the rout of half of the Federal Army proved. In order to reflect this mid-point reorganization, the following rules are in effect.

At any point after Longstreet enters the game, the Confederate may reorganize his army into two wings; the Left, commanded by Longstreet, and the Right, led by Polk. If Polk is a casualty, the next ranking corps commander takes charge of the Right Wing. Neither wing may be assigned more than one half of the total number of divisions available, (rounding up) nor may more than one existing corps be broken up to create this wing structure. The cavalry corps are excluded from this reassignment, and always remain directly under army control. *For example, Longstreet may be assigned no more than six of the eleven historically available infantry divisions, assuming no optional divisions are in play.*

The Confederate player may elect not to use this wing structure if he so chooses, in which case Longstreet (when he arrives) assumes command of the 1 Corps and Hood replaces Law in charge of Hood/1. Law is removed from play, but may be used to replace Hood, if Hood becomes a casualty.

3.3a Longstreet and Wing Command.

Once he assumes wing command, Longstreet functions like a corps commander. Any corps commanders under his authority are now exempt from the need to accept orders. As long as Bragg sends orders directly to Longstreet, only Longstreet must

roll for acceptance. Once he accepts, **all** the troops under his command may proceed to carry out those directions. Additionally, when rolling for initiative, all troops and leaders under Longstreet's control are exempted from any anti-initiative ratings from Bragg, and therefore roll with a 0 modifier.

3.3b Polk and Wing Command.

Unlike Longstreet, Polk performed poorly within this wing structure. Polk does not act merely as a "super corps commander," but instead as more of an intermediary army commander. If Bragg issues an order to Polk's Wing, Polk must roll for acceptance normally. Once Polk accepts, he then turns around and issues orders to his subordinate corps commanders, using the normal order procedure. That is, he determines his command points (as if he were an army commander) and order costs, issues his orders, and then rolls again for order acceptance for the particular subordinate involved. The subordinate corps orders would reflect orders which **support** and **carry out** the "general wing orders"—they do **not** have to be the **same** orders merely passed down. For any troops in Polk's own corps, this procedure is ignored, and these troops have accepted the order when Polk does.

When conducting initiative rolls, leaders under Polk's control do not use their own or their corps commander's anti-initiative rating, but rather Polk's rating, i.e., rolling with a -2 modifier.

3.3c Wing Command and Casualties

If a wing commander becomes a casualty, that wing is considered dissolved and the troops in it revert to their starting corps assignment. The only exception to this case is if Polk is a casualty **before** Longstreet arrives and the army is reorganized. In that case, the wings may be created using the next highest surviving corps commander in Polk's place, who operates under the restrictions of "Polk and Wing Command."

3.3d The Historical Wing Structure

For players so interested, the actual historical wing organization was:

Right Wing—Polk
Cheatham's Div (C/P)
Hill's Corps
Cleburne's Div (C/H)
Breckinridge's Div (B/H)
Res Corps—Walker
Walker's Div (W/Res)
Liddell's Div (L/Res)

Left Wing—Longstreet
Hindman's Div (H/P)
Buckner's Corps
Stewart's Div (S/B)
Preston's Div (P/B)
1 Corps—Hood
Hood's Div (H/1)
McLaw's Div (M/1)
Johnson's Prov Div (JPD/1)

The Lw Arty (3xb) may move with any unit of the Left Wing. Note that when the wing organization is not in effect, these guns are always considered to be attached to the 1st Corps.

3.3e Corps Attack Stoppage under the Wing Structure

When rolling for Corps Attack Stoppage, Longstreet's Wing checks as if it were a single corps of many divisions. Corps in Polk's Wing checks separately.

3.3f Command Radii under Wing Structure

In the RW (Polk's), **normal** Corps HQ to division and corps asset command radii is in effect, and troops always trace to their proper Corps HQ. Note that Polk's HQ serves as both RW and P Corps HQ when the wing structure is in effect.

In the LW (Longstreet's), **all** "Corps-level" command radii are traced directly to the LW HQ—the LW is essentially a "super corps" (as the Confederate wings have been in past series games). The individual Corps HQ's assigned to the LW basically have no command radii functions.

There is never any command radii from Wing HQ's to Corps HQ's, nor any command radii to be observed from the Army HQ to the Wing HQ's.

3.3g Bragg and Wing Command

After Bragg initiates the Wing Structure, he may **not** initially bypass his Wing commanders and issue orders directly to the corps commands. Instead, all orders must be issued to the Wings. Divisional

orders/goals may still be issued to individual divisions. Bragg **may** bypass the Wings after he successfully rolls a 12 on 2 dice, as if he were attempting to roll for initiative. Attempt this dice roll on each Command Phase after the Wing structure is put into effect. Once Bragg has rolled this "initiative," he may bypass the Wing Commanders as he chooses for the rest of the game. Beginning at 7 am, 20 Sept, add two to Bragg's dice roll, as his frustration builds up.

Alternatively, Bragg may dissolve the Wing Structure at any time and revert to a more traditional organization, (but he **may not** later re-create the Wing structure.) In all cases where both Bragg and Polk have issued orders to the same troops, each order supersedes the previous one as it becomes accepted.

Variants allow Bragg to be replaced by either Johnston or Lee. In these cases, Wing structure may still be created under the same guidelines and restrictions. The army commander in question would again roll as if he were attempting to gain "initiative" to obtain "bypass release"—Johnston would need a 10+, Lee an 8+.

3.4 Attachments and Detachments

No corps may ever attach divisions. Detachments may be only made in conjunction with the above wing rules. It may be necessary for a Wing to attach one division, if dividing the one corps allowed above. If optional troops are in play, they may be attached to a corps, an exception to this rule.

3.5 The W/Res Division

The W/Res divisional commander, Gist, is not yet in play at the start of the game. Until he and his brigade rejoin the corps as called for in the arrival schedule, the W/Res division is commanded by a Repl leader.

4.0 Minor Variants

4.1 Union Options

4.1a Allow 1/1/20 to enter with the rest of its division on the 19th. This option gives the Confederate player 1 VP.

4.1b Allow 2/1/21 to set up with

the rest of 1/21. This option gives the Confederate player 1 VP.

Both of the above brigades were detached to guard rear areas, 1/1/20 to the south and 2/1/21 to hold Chattanooga. The above options assume that Rosecrans elected to concentrate all possible forces for the fight.

4.1c Allow the following units: Morgan, 3/1/Res, 1/2/Res, 3/2/Res, and 3/3/Res, and the 2 optional Res artillery units, Rb(5) & Rb(2); to set up in all scenarios with the rest of the Res Corps. This option gives the Confederate player 6 VP. The status of 2/Res is now considered a regular division, and 3/3/Res has the status defined for 2/2/Res in the Union special rules.

This option assumes that Rosecrans did not need to leave so many troops behind to guard his supply line, the railroad from Nashville. More troops from rear area departments were made available to take over these tasks, allowing Rosecrans to concentrate more men at the front. The actual locations of these four brigades were: 3/1/Res—Murfreesboro, 1/2 Res and 3/2/Res—Stevenson, Alabama, 3/3/Res—Chattanooga.

4.2 Confederate Options

4.2a Allow the rest of Longstreet's 1st Corps to arrive when Longstreet himself does, at 10:00 pm on the 19th, at E. These units are: W/M/1, B/M/1, J/H/1 & A/H/1. This option gives the Union player 4 VP.

The assumption here is that the troops sent from Virginia ran into fewer delays, and Longstreet was able to concentrate his entire command on the Chickamauga battlefield.

4.2b Allow M/L/Res to set up with the rest of L/Res in all scenarios. This option gives the Union player 1 VP.

When Walker's Reserve Corps was transferred from Joseph E. Johnston's Mississippi department, this unit (Maxey's Bde, originally of French's Division) was left behind.

4.2c Allow the Lo/— division to enter at E, at 10:30 am, 19th. This division enters with orders to report to the Army HQ. Any division marked “/—” has no permanent corps attachment. It may be attached to any corps, or receive direction from the army HQ directly in the form of divisional goals. This option gives the Union player 5 VP.

More troops from Johnston. Loring's division was left behind also, with numbers too few to defend the entire department. In a true strategic sense, it seems to be a better use of these troops to concentrate overwhelming power against the Union, with Bragg.

4.2d Allow the St/— division to enter at E, at 9:00 pm on the 19th. The division enters with orders identical to Lo/—, above. This option gives the Union 3 VP.

Again, following the principle of strategic concentration, this unit under Carter Stevenson is made available to the Southern player. Actually, their appearance here is a bit more far-fetched, because this division was captured and paroled at Vicksburg. By the middle of October, these troops were “exchanged” with paroled Federals, and being integrated with Bragg's army. During September, they were refitting in Alabama. Here it is assumed they could be resupplied and made combat ready by the time of the battle.

4.2e Replace Bragg with Johnston. Ignore all of Bragg's anti-initiative (Polk's Corps anti-initiative is still in effect). All other rules are in effect. This option gives the Union player 4 VP.

The anti-Bragg feeling within the Army of Tennessee by the fall of 1863 was definitely impairing the smooth functioning of command. Lost opportunities and barren victories were the army's legacy under Bragg. Had Bragg not been such a strong friend of Davis, it is likely that he would have been replaced before this time, if only to restore the confidence of the army. Joseph E. Johnston, nominally in command of the entire Western Theater, was the best candidate. Indeed, after the Chattanooga disaster, Johnston finally did take over.

4.2f Replace Bragg with Robert E. Lee. All of the rules in 5, above, are in effect here. This option gives the Union player 6 VP.

Before the battle, there was an influential undercurrent of opinion (including Longstreet himself) that wanted Lee to head west with the troops from his army and take command. Lee refused, not wishing to leave the familiar Virginia Theater for one unknown to him. However, this question remains one of the most tantalizing historical alternatives, akin to the question of Jackson's presence at Gettysburg. Here it is assumed that Lee arrives ahead of his troops,

replacing Bragg a couple of weeks before the battle.

5.0 Victory

Measuring success or failure is at best a relative thing. Bragg's actual objective was to destroy the Union army. After a quickly abandoned attempt at attack, Rosecrans was content to survive intact. Bragg obviously failed in his larger goal, while Rosecrans cannot be considered entirely successful either. In the end, Bragg won a “minor” victory, robbed of greater success by the massive losses his troops suffered. The Federals lived to fight another day, and hence the title of this game, **Barren Victory**. Each scenario will list the specific levels of victory, and any special conditions that apply.

Victory points are garnered by inflicting losses on your opponent, and by possession of specific terrain objectives. Additionally, VP's will be awarded to your opponent when using any of the minor variants/options. The following schedule applies.

5.1 VP's awarded for casualties:

Each side is awarded VP for inflicting losses on his opponent. Only casualties are counted for this, ignore all straggler losses.

For the Union Player:

CSA Losses	VP
0 to 50	0
51 to 90	3
91 to 115	6
116 to 140	10
141 to 165	15
166 to 190	20
191 to 210	25
211 to 270	30
271 or more	35

For the Confederate Player:

USA Losses	VP
0 to 45	0
46 to 85	3
86 to 110	6
111 to 135	10
136 to 160	15
161 to 180	20
181 to 200	25
201 to 225	30
226 or more	35

5.2 Additional VP awards for wrecked corps:

If 50% or more of the brigades are wrecked (again, ignore straggler losses for this calculation—consider casualties only), additional VP's are awarded according to the corresponding table.

To the Union Player:

For wrecked CSA Corps:	VP
Polk's Corps	6
Hill's Corps	4
Res Corps	3
Buckner's Corps	4
1st Corps	6
Wheeler's Cav	3
Forrest's Cav	3

To the Confederate Player:

For wrecked USA Corps:	VP
14 Corps	10
20 Corps	6
21 Corps	6
Res Corps	2
Cav Corps	4

Note: disregard any attachments or detachments to/from corps for these calculations.

5.3 VP's awarded for terrain objectives:

VP's are awarded to each player for capturing specific objectives, and for gaining control of his opponent's line of retreat. Both armies were very vulnerable to isolation, operating in supply-poor mountains.

The Union player is awarded 5 VP for controlling each one of entry hexes D, E, or F at the end of the game. Additionally, he is awarded 1 VP for each CSA combat unit (infantry, cavalry, or artillery) which is unable to trace a line of communications to any one of entry hexes D, E, or F, at the end of the game.

The Confederate player is awarded VP for each of the following objectives:

Entry hex G	7 VP
H & I	5 VP
J & K	5 VP

When two hexes are listed for one award, **both** hexes must be controlled before any VP are given. There is no award for control of **only** hex J, for instance.

The Confederate is awarded 1 VP for every Union combat unit (infantry, cavalry, or artillery) which is unable to trace a line of communication to any one of the following entry hexes: G, H, I, J, or K, at the end of the game.

For either side, NO VP's are awarded for Leaders, HQ's or Supply units which cannot trace a line of communications. When considering artillery units, count **only** those "actual" artillery units, **not** detached batteries.

A line of communications is defined as a path of hexes of any length, free of enemy units and zones of control, from the unit in question to the entry hex. **Only TEN of these hexes in the path may be NON-ROAD hexes.** In other words, a given unit must use a combination of road or trail and up to TEN non-road hexes to trace an unblocked path to an exit hex. This path may not cross otherwise impassible terrain.

5.4 Levels of Victory

To determine the level of victory, add up all points for both sides, then subtract the Union total from the Confederate total. Compare the resulting number to this chart, the corresponding line gives the level of victory:

CSA Massive	25 or more
CSA Major	11 to 24
CSA Minor	5 to 10
Draw	4 to -5
USA Minor	-6 to -10
USA Major	-11 to -24
USA Massive	-25 or less

6.0 Set Up Notes

When setting up the scenarios, the following standard rules and definitions apply:

6.0a All units set up in line, dismounted, or unlimbered, unless specifically directed otherwise in the scenario.

6.0b A number followed by a **b** indicates an artillery unit. For example, 14b stands for an artillery unit of the 14th Corps.

6.0c A parenthesized number next to an artillery unit, i.e. (4), indicates the starting strength of that artillery unit

6.0d The symbol "w/i #X" means set up the specified units within that number of hexes of a specific hex (exclusive.)

6.0e Army, Corps, and Wing commanders set up with their HQ's. Division leaders set up with any unit in their division, unless specifically assigned to a given hex.

6.0f All scenarios start with the Confederate as the first player, except in scenarios 1 and 6, which begin with the Union player phase. (Note that the CSA player is still considered the first player, but that these two scenarios start in the second half of the game turn.)

6.0g In all scenarios, historical losses from previous scenarios **do** count for

victory. In effect, all previous historical casualties are additive. For instance, at the start of scenario 3, the Union player has already lost 54 strength points from the first day's fighting. Therefore, the CSA player starts scenario three with 3 VP for Union losses.

Scenario 1: The First Day

The first day's fighting was conducted piecemeal, as Bragg sent his divisions into action one at a time, instead of waiting to concentrate overwhelming power in a simultaneous assault. Despite this, the fighting on day one was bloody. More than once, Confederate troops ruptured the Union line, only to be pushed back by fresh forces. Interestingly enough, the Union Army launched the first attack, as Thomas sent forces forward to capture what he thought was an isolated Confederate brigade near Reed's bridge. The Confederates counterattacked furiously, and the battle was on.

First Turn: 7:30 am, 19 September (Union Player Turn)

Last Turn: 6:00 pm, 19 September

Scenario Length: 22 turns

Artillery Ammunition:

USA: 250 points

CSA: 200 points

Set Up:

Union:

1/2/Cav **B8.15**; Wldr, Wb **B14.17**; 14 HQ & supply **B17.31 (Kelly House)**; 1/14 (col), 14b (limb) w/i **2 A17.02**; 3/14 (col), 14b (limb) w/i **2 A22.05**; 21 HQ & supply **B12.09**; 1/21, 21b w/i **1 B11.05**; 2/21, 21b w/i **1 B14.10**; 3/21, 21b w/i **1 B13.08**; 2/2/ Res **A36.06**; All other units of Res Corps w/i **10 of A24.30**.

Union Orders:

1/14 and 3/14 have each been given a divisional goal to attack and destroy the Confederate troops around Jay's Mill.

21 Corps is ordered to defend in place to protect the roads behind it, in order to allow the rest of the Union Army to arrive.

2/2/Res has a divisional goal to return to Res Corps HQ.

1/2/Cav has a divisional goal to defend in place.

No other Union troops have any orders.

Confederate:

Army HQ & Supply **B32.13**; 1 Corps HQ & Supply w/i **2 B25.18**; 3 x LWb w/i **2 B25.18**; JPD/1 w/i **1 B22.17**; H/1 w/i **1 B24.19**; B Corps HQ & Supply **B33.09**; S/B, Bb w/i **1 B31.12**; P/B, Bb w/i **1 B27.06**; FCav HQ &

Supply w/i 2 **B34.32**; P/F Cav, FCavb w/i 2 **B34.32**; A/FCav w/i 1 **B33.20**; P Corps HQ & Supply **B22.04**; H/P, Pb w/i 1 **B14.05**; C/P, Pb w/i 2 **B19.05**; Res HQ **B36.25**; L/Res, Resb w/i 1 **B32.22**; E/W/Res, W/W/Res w/i 1 **B41.28**; Res Supply **B42.28**.

W/Res is commanded by a Repl leader

Confederate Orders:

The Res Corps is ordered to support the defense of Jay's Mill and the FCav if they are attacked there.

FCav is ordered to defend Jay's Mill and Reed's Bridge.

No other Confederate troops have any orders at start.

Reinforcements:

Both sides receive reinforcements as called for by the arrival schedules for the duration of the scenario.

Victory:

The standard victory conditions as given in the Game Rules booklet apply.

Scenario 2: The Afternoon of the 19th

The fighting on the first day reached its peak in the afternoon, when the Union center was twice breached by Confederate divisional attacks. Rosecrans' HQ was itself almost caught up in the action. Fresh Union arrivals managed to salvage the situation, repulsing the Confederates under A. P. Stewart and Hood. Finally, starting at 6 pm, Cleburne's Confederate division was ordered to launch a dusk assault, and the fighting lingered on until 8 pm. Players should note that many divisions start this scenario at the extreme limits of the command radius from the corps commanders.

First Turn: 2:00 pm, 19 September

Last Turn: 8:00 pm, 19 September

Scenario Length: 11 turns

Artillery Ammunition:

USA: 225 points

CSA: 210 points

Set Up:

Union:

Army HQ & Supply **B9.19**; 1/2/Cav **B8.17**; Wldr, Wb **B14.16**; 14 Corps HQ & Supply **B17.31**; 2/4/14, 14b **B16.20**; 3/4/14 **B19.26**; 3/14 w/i 1 **A19.03**; 1/14 w/i 1 **A19.07**; 14b (limb) **A20.05**; 14b (limb) **A17.02**; 20 Corps HQ & Supply **B10.04**; 3/20, 20b w/i 2 **B10.04**; 2/1/20 **B17.18**; 3/1/20, 20b **B17.17**; 2/20, 20b w/i 1 **B21.30**; 21 HQ & supply **B12.07**; 1/1/21, 21b **B14.10**; 3/1/21 **B13.09**; 1/3/21, 21b **B16.22**; 2/3/21 **B16.23**; 3/3/21

B16.24; 1/2/21, 21b **B21.26**; 2/2/21 **B21.27**; 3/2/21 **B19.25** ex **B20.25**; Res Corps w/i 7 **A24.30**.

Union Orders:

2/21 and **2/20** are attached to 14 Corps.

14, 20 & 21 Corps are all currently ordered to defend in place.

1/2/Cav has a divisional goal to defend in place.

Res Corps has no current orders.

3/21 has a divisional goal to defend the Lafayette Road between the Brotherton and Brock houses.

Confederate:

Army HQ & Supply **B32.13**; P Corps HQ & Supply **B33.19**; H/P (col), Pb (limb) **B25.05**, **B24.05**, **B23.05**, **B22.04**; S/C/P **B24.27**; St/C/P **B24.26**; W/C/P **B24.24**; M/C/P **B23.24**; J/C/P **B21.23**; Pb **B26.28**; B Corps HQ **B25.18**; B Corps Supply **B23.13**; Br/S/B **B21.22**; B/S/B **B22.21**; C/S/B **B23.21**; G/P/B, Bb **B22.13**; T/P/B, Bb **B23.14**; 3/P/B **B24.13**; 1 Corps HQ & Supply w/i 1 **B23.17**; 3 x LWb w/i 1 **B23.17**; G/JPD/1 **B20.17**; J/JPD/1 **B20.18**; M/JDP/1 **B20.19**; L/H/1 **B22.18**; Tex/H/1 **B22.19**; B/H/1 **B23.19**; H Corps HQ & Supply **B40.10**; C/H (col), Hb (limb) on road from **B40.09** to **B40.06**, inclusive; FCav Corps w/i 4 **B34.32**; Res Corps (minus Gist, G/W/Res) w/i 2 **B30.30**.

Confederate Orders:

B Corps is ordered to send S/B (only) to attack the Union center between the Brotherton and Brock houses.

H/P has a divisional goal/order to cross at Dalton Ford and return to Polk's Corps HQ.

No other Confederate troops have any orders at start.

Reinforcements:

Both sides receive reinforcements as called for by the arrival schedules for the duration of the scenario.

Victory:

The standard victory conditions given in the Game Rules booklet apply.

USA losses at start 39

CSA losses at start 40

Scenario 3: The Second Day

With one day's inconclusive action behind them, both armies prepared to renew the struggle on the morning of the 20th. Rosecrans abandoned all thought of offensive action, content to defend his existing positions. Bragg obliged, electing to continue the role as aggressor. How-

ever, the arrival of Longstreet and the availability of fresh Confederate troops would greatly effect the second day's outcome.

First Turn: 5:00 am, 20 September

Last Turn: 7:00 pm, 20 September

Scenario Length: 28 turns

Artillery Ammunition:

USA: 160 points

CSA: 135 points

Set Up:

Union:

Army HQ & Supply **B9.19**; Wldr, Wb **B6.14**; Cav HQ & Supply **B3.04**; 1/Cav w/i 2 **B6.03**; 14 Corps HQ & Supply **B17.31**; 1/1/14 **B19.33**; 2/1/14 **B19.32**; 3/1/14, 14b **B19.34**; 2/14, 14b w/i 1 **B14.31**; 1/3/14 **B15.28**; 2/3/14, 14b **B15.27**; 3/3/14 **B17.32**; 2/4/14 **B14.28**; 3/4/14, 14b **B17.29**; 1/2/20 **B18.34**; 2/2/20 **B18.33**; 3/2/20, 20b **B19.31**; 1/2/21 **B18.29**; 2/2/21, 21b **B19.30**; 3/2/21 **B18.31**; 20 Corps HQ & Supply **B9.22**; 2/1/20 **B12.21**; 3/1/20, 20b **B11.21**; 1/3/20 **B8.17**; 2/3/20, 20b **B9.18**; 3/3/20 **B10.18**; 21 HQ & supply **B12.24**; 1/1/21, 21b **B13.23**; 3/1/21 **B13.24**; 1/3/21, 21b **B14.25**; 2/3/21 **B14.26**; 3/3/21 **B12.26**; Res Corps, 1/2/Cav w/i 7 **A24.30**.

Union Orders:

2/21 and **2/20** are attached to 14 Corps.

1/2/Cav is attached to the Res Corps.

No Union troops have any orders

Confederate:

Army HQ & Supply **B30.12**; LW HQ **B20.23**; B Corps HQ & Supply **B21.15**; G/P/B **B20.16**, ex **B20.17**; T/P/B, Bb **B20.15**; 3/P/B, Bb **B20.14**; S/B w/i 1 **B23.26**; 1 Corps HQ & Supply **B22.24**; 3 x LWb with any unit of the LW; H/1 w/i 1 **B22.23**; M/1 w/i 1 **B24.24**; G/JPD/1 **B19.25**; J/JPD/1 **B19.24**; M/JDP/1 **B20.25**; M/H/P **B19.19**, ex **19.20**; A/H/P **B19.21**, ex **19.22**; D/H/P, Pb **B20.20**; RW HQ & P Corps Supply **B28.30**; C/P, Pb(4) w/i 2 **B27.28**; H Corps HQ & Supply **B26.32**; P/C/H **B23.28**; W/C/H **B24.28**; D/C/H, Hb **B24.29**; H/Br/H **A26.02**; S/Br/H **A26.03**; A/Br/H **A26.04**; Hb **A27.04**; FCav Corps w/i 3 **A22.08**; Res Corps (minus Gist, G/W/Res) w/i 2 **A30.01**; Gist, G/W/Res (col) **B44.15**.

Confederate Orders:

The rules for Wing structures are in effect. Longstreet and Polk command their historic Wing structures.

Polk (RW) has orders to attack the Union 14 Corps, but has not yet started issuing them to his subordinates.

Longstreet (LW) has no orders.

P/B has a divisional goal to defend

the Confederate left flank between Hall's Ford and the Brock house.

Gist and **G/W/Res** are ordered to move to join their Corps. Initiative may not be used to change this order. Once these units have rejoined the Res Corps, this restriction no longer applies.

Reinforcements:

Both sides receive reinforcements as called for by the arrival schedules for the duration of the scenario.

Victory:

The standard victory conditions given in the Game Rules booklet apply.

USA losses at start 54

CSA losses at start 72

Scenario 4: The Breakthrough

The turning point of the battle occurred at midday on the 20th, when Longstreet's command launched its attack on the Union right. Shortly after 11:00 am, Longstreet's leading troops moved forward, punching through a fortuitous hole in the Federal battleline. Wood's division, responding to a misunderstood order, was pulled out of line and moved north. Given this gap, the Confederates flanked the adjoining Yankees, and in a few minutes thousands of Federals were flung back. The results of this attack were spectacular, as Rosecrans, two of his corps commanders, and four Federal divisions routed and were driven off the field. Many Union soldiers did not stop retreating until they reached the safety of Chattanooga.

First Turn: 11:00 am, 20 September

Last Turn: 6:00 pm, 20 September

Scenario Length: 15 turns

Artillery Ammunition:

USA: 155 points

CSA: 110 points

Set Up:

Union:

Army HQ & Supply **B9.19**; Wldr, Wb **B6.14**; Cav HQ & Supply **B3.04**; 1/Cav w/i **2 B6.03**; Crook, 2/2/Cav, Cavb **B3.05**; 14 Corps HQ & Supply **B17.31**; 1/1/14 **B19.33**; 2/1/14 **B19.32**; 3/1/14, 14b **B19.34**; 2/14, 14b(4) w/i **1 B14.31**; 1/3/14, 14b **B15.28**; 2/3/14 **B15.27**; 3/3/14 **B14.28**; 2/4/14 **B16.28**; 3/4/14, 14b **B17.29**; 1/2/20 **B18.33**; 2/2/20 **B18.34**; 3/2/20, 20b **B19.31**; 1/2/21 **B18.29**; 2/2/21, 21b **B19.30**; 3/2/21 **B18.32**; 20 Corps HQ & Supply **B9.22**; 2/1/20 **B14.21** (must face southeast); 3/1/20 **B15.22** (must face southeast); 20b **B13.21** (must face southeast); 3/20 (col), 20b (limb) w/i **1 B10.20**; 21 Corps HQ & supply **B12.24**; 1/1/21 (col) **B13.25**; 3/1/21 (col) **B13.24**; 21b (limb)

B13.23; 3/21, 21b w/i **1 B12.27**; Res Corps, 1/2/Cav w/i **7 A24.30**.

Union Orders:

2/21 and **2/20** are attached to 14 Corps.

1/21 is ordered to move to B16.28 & B16.29, go into line, and defend.

1/2/Cav is attached to the Res Corps.

No other units have any orders.

Union Special Rule:

The Union player automatically checks for panic at the end of the first turn. His current status is 1, and add three to the die roll. This check is made in addition to the one normal demand that the CSA player may make during the course of the scenario.

Confederate:

Army HQ & Supply **B30.12**; LW HQ **B20.24**; 3x LWb w/i **1 B20.24**; 1 Corps HQ & Supply **B20.25**; H/1 w/i **1 B19.24**; M/1 w/i **1 B22.24**; G/JPD/1 **B17.24**; J/JPD/1 **B17.25**; M/JDP/1 **B18.25**; B Corps HQ & Supply **B21.15**; G/P/B **B20.14**; T/P/B **B16.17**; 3/P/B, Bb **B19.16**; Br/S/B **B20.27**; C/S/B, Bb **B19.27**; B/S/B **B18.26**; M/H/P **B17.23**; A/H/P **B17.22**; D/H/P **B17.21**; Pb (limb) **B18.22**; RW HQ & P Corps Supply **B28.30**; C/P, Pb(4) w/i **2 B27.28**; H Corps HQ & Supply **B26.32**; P/C/H, Hb **B22.30**; W/C/H **B22.31**; D/C/H **B22.29**; Br/H, Hb w/i **1 A24.01**; FCav Corps w/i **2 A22.08**; Res Corps w/i **2 A22.02**.

Confederate Orders:

The rules for Wing structures are in effect. Longstreet and Polk command their historic Wing structures.

Longstreet (LW) has orders to attack the Union troops between the Brock house (B15.19) and the Poe house (B16.26), in order to capture the road junctions at B8.25 and B13.25 or Hexes J and K.

P/B has a divisional goal to defend the Confederate left flank between Hall's ford and the Brock house.

Polk (RW) is to attack Thomas' position in order to clear the Lafayette Road (B16.29 to B17.35, inclusive), and also to capture the Snodgrass house (in order to link up with LW.) Polk has accepted these orders, but has not yet started issuing them to his subordinates.

Bragg may bypass his Wing commanders and issue orders directly to corps.

Reinforcements:

Both sides receive reinforcements as called for by the arrival schedules for the duration of the scenario.

Victory:

The standard victory conditions given in the Game Rules booklet apply.

USA losses at start 71

CSA losses at start 82

Scenario 5: The Rock of Chickamauga

After the collapse of 20th and 21st Corps, only Thomas and his 14th Corps were left on the field to prevent a total Southern victory. Granger's Reserve Corps arrived in the nick of time from the north, blunting Longstreet's attack on Thomas' exposed flank. The waning hours of the battle were given over to Confederate efforts to dislodge the remaining Union troops. Finally, about 5:30 pm, Thomas decided to follow the rest of the Federal army off the field, having shielded their rout long enough. He emerged as the hero of the Army, soon to replace Rosecrans as commander.

First Turn: 1:00 pm, 20 September

Last Turn: 7:00 pm, 20 September

Scenario Length: 13 turns

Artillery Ammunition:

USA: 55 points

CSA: 75 points

Set Up:

Union:

14 Corps HQ & Supply **B17.31**; 1/1/14, 3/1/14, 14b **B19.34**; 2/1/14 **B18.34**; 1/3/14, 3/3/14 **B11.29**; 2/3/14 **B10.28**; 2/4/14, 14b **B16.29**; 3/4/14, 14b(3) **B17.29**; 1/2/20 **B19.32**; 2/2/20 **B19.33**; 3/2/20, 20b **B19.31**; 1/2/21 **B18.29**; 2/2/21, 21b(4) **B19.30**; 3/2/21 **B17.33**; 1/1/21, 21b(3) **B12.29**; 3/1/21 **B13.30**; Res HQ and Supply **B10.30**; 1/1/Res **B7.29**; 2/1/Res, Resb **B8.28**; 2/2/Res **B9.28**; 1/2/Cav **A35.32**.

Special Reinforcement:

4:00 pm: 2/14, 3/20, 14b(4), 20b(3)—arrive at G, with orders to defend w/in 6 hexes of A6.30, in order to block the Rossville Gap.

No other Union reinforcements are used in this scenario.

Panic has already occurred.

Union Orders:

2/21 and **2/20** are attached to 14 Corps.

14 Corps has orders to defend in place as long as possible, to protect the retreat of the army.

1/21 has an initiative-based divisional goal with the same mission of 14 Corps.

Res Corps has an initiative-based order to defend 14 Corps' flank.

1/2/Cav is independent for this scenario only.

Confederate:

Army HQ & Supply A25.05; LW HQ B13.25; 3 x LWb w/i 2 B13.25; 1 Corps HQ & Supply B11.25; G/JPD/1 B10.26; J/JPD/1 B9.26; M/JDP/1 B11.27; L/H/1 B11.26; Tex/H/1, B/H/1 B12.26; H/M/1 B13.27; K/M/1 B14.27; B Corps HQ & Supply B17.24; P/B (col), Bb (limb) w/i 1 B16.24; S/B, Bb w/i 1 B19.27; H/P, Pb w/i 1 B7.26; RW HQ & P Corps Supply A22.05; J/C/P B21.35; W/C/P B22.35; St/C/P, Pb(4) A22.02; S/C/P A22.03; M/C/P A22.04; H Corps HQ & Supply B22.31; C/H, Hb in line from B21.30 to B21.34; Br/H, Hb w/i 1 A20.03; FCav HQ and Supply A21.09; D/P/FCav, Pegram A21.10; A/A/FCav A19.08; F/A/FCav, FCavb A19.09; S/P/FCav A38.30; Res HQ A18.03; Res Supply A17.05; L/L/Res A16.03; W/L/Res, Resb A17.03; E/W/Res A21.03; W/W/Res A20.03; G/W/Res A19.03.

Confederate Orders:

The rules for Wing structures are in effect. Longstreet and Polk command their historic Wing structures.

Polk (RW) is to attack Thomas' position in order to clear the Lafayette Road (B16.29 to B17.35, inclusive), and also to capture the Snodgrass house (in order to link up with LW.) Polk has accepted these orders, but has not yet started issuing them to his subordinates.

Longstreet (LW) has no orders.

FCav is ordered to block the Lafayette Rd between Cloud Church and the McDonald house.

S/P/FCav is considered independent for this scenario only.

Bragg may bypass his Wing commanders and issue orders directly to corps.

Reinforcements:

The CSA receives reinforcements called for by the arrival schedules for the duration of the scenario, the USA only gets the special reinforcement indicated above.

Victory:

The standard victory conditions as given in the Game Rules booklet apply. In addition, use the following to adjust the level of victory accordingly:

Shift one level of victory in the Union favor for **each hour turn**—starting with the 5 pm turn—that 14 Corps has *less than* 9 of its brigades wrecked, counting both dead and stragglers. For this purpose, consider the 14 Corps to consist of 1/14, 3/14, 4/14, 2/20, and 2/21. Ignore all other

Union troops for this calculation. The results of this shift are cumulative.

Special: No matter how many shifts accumulate, the best the Union player can achieve is a minor victory.

USA losses at start 113

CSA losses at start 125

Scenario 6: The Battle of Chickamauga

This scenario recreates the entire battle, addressing the action on both days.

First Turn: 7:30 am, 19 September (Start with Union player-turn)

Last Turn: 6:00 pm, 20 September

Scenario Length: 59 turns

Artillery Ammunition:

USA: 250 points

CSA: 200 points

Set Up:

Both sides set up according to Scenario 1.

Orders are those given in Scenario 1.

Reinforcements:

Both sides receive reinforcements according to the respective reinforcement or arrival schedules.

Victory:

The standard victory conditions as given in the Game Rules booklet apply.

Historical Notes: The Chickamauga Campaign

When troops of the Federal Army of the Tennessee occupied Chattanooga, Tennessee on 9 September, 1863, William S. Rosecrans silenced his critics with a brilliant coup. For nine months, since the battle of Murfreesboro at the new year, Rosecrans had remained inactive with the Federal army, despite prodding from all directions. Under ever greater pressure to show success in its prosecution of the war, the Lincoln government needed victories on the offensive. Gettysburg and Vicksburg were welcome successes in the East and along the Mississippi, but Lincoln also wanted action against the deep South, with an eye on Atlanta, second only to Richmond as a military industrial center for the Confederacy. The gateway to Atlanta, of course, was Chattanooga.

Rosecrans refused to move in haste, preferring to arrange everything care-

fully before launching an undoubtedly difficult offensive. In many ways, his task was the most difficult of any Federal army's in 1863. His supply line rested on a very tenuous rail line through Nashville and points north, exposed to endless cavalry raids. Protecting this line consumed large numbers of his infantrymen, posted in blockhouses and small garrisons across middle Tennessee. His cavalry was inadequate in both men and mounts, greatly outnumbered by the Confederates under Forrest and Wheeler. He worked diligently throughout the summer at solving these problems, even mounting a brigade of infantry (Wilder's) to strengthen his cavalry.

Finally, by late June, Rosecrans felt he was ready. What followed was all too rare in the Civil War: a masterful campaign of maneuver which allowed Rosecrans to capture his primary objective, Chattanooga, without a fight. Caught off balance, Bragg retreated to the mountains of north Georgia.

The fall of Chattanooga on 9 September provoked much protest in Southern military and political circles. Bragg's Army of Tennessee, already dissent ridden with quarrels over past campaigns (notably Perryville) lost what was left of their confidence in their commander. Most of the corps and division commanders already held grudges against their difficult superior, and this evidence of further military defeat convinced them of Bragg's unfitness for command. President Davis, however, never lost confidence in his long-time friend, and Bragg remained in charge.

Simultaneously, events in Virginia would have a momentous impact in north Georgia. Before Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, (which culminated in the defeat at Gettysburg) a plan had been put forth by Longstreet to remain on the defensive in Virginia and reinforce the center, under Bragg. Longstreet hoped that with large reinforcements, the Army of Tennessee could undertake a successful offensive, perhaps even recapturing Tennessee and parts of Kentucky. The plan was shelved in May, but by late August it was revived in the face of Rosecrans successes.

The Army of Northern Virginia was to detach its 1st Corps, Longstreet's command (less the remnants of Pickett's division, still refitting south of Richmond), and move it by rail to Bragg. Originally the transfer was to take two days, but the fall of both Knoxville and Chattanooga eliminated the direct rail link, and the 1st Corps embarked on a 9 day tour of the deep south. Not since 1861 had troop movements been greeted with such exuberance. Most of Longstreet's men passed near their homes for the first time in 2 years, and many went

temporarily AWOL to visit loved ones. Longstreet brought with him nine brigades of infantry, of which five would arrive in time to play an important role in the coming battle.

Just before his departure, Longstreet urged Lee to join him, preferring to serve under Lee's steady hand in the coming fight. Lee declined. President Davis might never have agreed to let him go anyway—fearing for the safety of the Southern Capitol—but the possibility makes for interesting supposition. Lee seemed to excel in such counter-stroke situations.

For his part, Bragg was still resolved to offer battle. Having been outmaneuvered at Chattanooga, the Confederate general prepared a trap for Rosecrans. Misinformation, via spies and deserters, was fed to the Federal army to the effect that Bragg's men were demoralized and almost defeated, fleeing towards Atlanta, one hundred miles south. Rosecrans was convinced that the intelligence was accurate and hastily prepared to follow up his initial successes. Plunging into the rugged terrain of northern Georgia, he set off in pursuit.

However, the Army of Tennessee was far from routed. Reinforcements had been pulled from other departments, building Bragg's army up from 35,000 to near 55,000 men even before Longstreet's arrival. Now the Confederates lay in wait behind the long screening mountain ridges south of Chattanooga, ready to strike. In his haste, Rosecrans spread his forces widely in order to move his columns south as rapidly as possible. By the second week of September, the Union troops were dispersed over sixty miles of countryside, negotiating three passes through Missionary Ridge.

These passes led into a valley known as McLemore's Cove, sheltered on the opposite side by Pigeon Mountain. Behind the mountain, Bragg deployed his forces, ready to attack. As Rosecrans' center column, under MG George Thomas, entered the valley, Bragg planned to attack it from three sides and crush the Federals.

The plan fell apart. Delays and confusion riddled the Southern command, and the opportunity slipped away as Thomas realized his danger and notified Rosecrans. Bragg was furious at the errors, blaming division commander Thomas Hindman and corps commander D. H. Hill. Bragg preferred charges against Hindman, which were subsequently dropped. The real fault seems to lie with the lack of proper coordination Bragg imposed, though the mutual feelings of distrust felt between Bragg and his subordinates could hardly have helped.

A second plan, aimed at Rosecrans' northernmost column under MG Crittenden, commander of the 21st Corps, also failed. Crittenden protected Rosecrans' communication with his base at Chattanooga by holding positions near Lee and Gordon's Mill. Bragg ordered another corps commander, Lt Gen Leonidas Polk to attack Crittenden. Polk requested more troops and did nothing further, allowing more time to slip away.

By 12 September, Rosecrans had realized his error and hurried to correct it. Far from fleeing in disorder, Bragg was threatening Rosecrans' army with disaster and the Federal Commander ordered his troops to concentrate on Crittenden's position. Alert to such a move, Bragg ordered his forces to the same vicinity, setting the stage for the coming battle.

Rosecrans was by now well aware of his danger, though not to its full extent. Curiously enough, the Federal high command in Washington failed to notify him of Longstreet's transfer. Indeed, the Union reaction to all of the Confederate concentrations was sluggish at best, and no Federal forces were sent to Rosecrans from either the East or the Mississippi Valley to offset the Confederate build-up. Only later, after disaster had come, would the Union forces make their own epic rail journey, just before the Chattanooga battle in November.

Both armies were now concentrating along the Chickamauga Creek near Lee and Gordon's Mill, 10 to 15 miles south of Chattanooga. Bragg's next battleplan called for his troops to assail Rosecrans' left flank, interposing the Confederates between the Union army and Chattanooga itself. The 18th of September, found both armies skirmishing for control of the creek crossings north of Lee and Gordon's Mill. The Confederates secured the crossings, though not without some bloodshed, as Union cavalry and Wilder's mounted infantry disputed the issue.

On the morning of the 19th, it was the Union army which took the offensive. An erroneous report from BG Daniel McCook's brigade of the Federal Reserve Corps placed a lone Confederate brigade near Jay's Mill, and Thomas decided to send his two lead divisions, 1/14 and 3/14, to destroy the enemy if possible.

Unfortunately for these Union divisions, the lone Confederate brigade, one of Bushrod Johnson's, had moved on south and was replaced by Pegram's division of Forrest's Cavalry Corps. Additionally, the five brigades comprising Walker's Confederate Reserve Corps were near at hand to support the Confederate Cavalry. When

Thomas' lead troops (Brannon, 3/14) opened the fighting at 7:30 am, they were fiercely opposed by both Forrest and Walker's lead Confederate division. Brannon was repulsed and pushed back on 1/14 (Baird's division).

Baird's newly deployed strength in turn pushed back the Confederates, until Walker's other division hurriedly arrived to launch a devastating counterattack. Baird was sent back in disorder, with one unit, composed of US regulars (mostly recruits) badly damaged.

This "to and fro" pattern was destined to be repeated throughout the rest of the 19th, as fresh troops on both sides arrived and took their turn in the fray. Johnson's Federal Division (2/20) was sent to the aid of the 14 Corps and halted Walker's advance. In response, Cheatham's Confederate division, a powerful force of five brigades, attacked near the Brock house and caught Johnson in the flank. By noon, Thomas again needed fresh troops to stabilize his center and repulse Cheatham.

Each fresh unit extended the fighting further south, and Thomas' next two arrivals followed true to form. Palmer's (2/21) and Reynolds' (4/14) troops were committed by early afternoon to stopping Cheatham. They succeeded, but at a cost.

Rosecrans so far had influenced the battle very little, content to feed Thomas extra troops when needed. By midday, five of the eight Union divisions on the field had been assigned to the 14th Corps. The other two corps, with only three divisions between them, held their fronts thinly at best. A dangerous gap developed at the midpoint of the Union line. At 2:30 pm a fresh Confederate unit, Stewart's division of Buckner's Corps, dealt the Federal center a powerful blow.

Bragg was still intent on his original plan to flank the Federal army to the north, and had remained unaware of the opportunity in the Union center. Stewart's men were ordered to follow Cheatham's now used up force, but instead, (following the path of least resistance) smashed into Van Cleeve's (3/21) men south of the Brotherton House. The Confederate attack was a success, sending Van Cleeve's men fleeing and overrunning 12 Union cannon. Rosecrans' HQ was itself threatened with capture. Only Reynold's (4/14) quick response, holding stubbornly to the shoulder of the hole and massing fresh artillery, prevented further enemy success. Wilder's mounted men attacked from the opposite flank, coming up from the south to cause Stewart concern for his exposed units. Wilder's success, coupled with Reynold's firm actions, held the Union center long

enough for yet more fresh troops to arrive. Negley's division (2/14) filled the gap.

Next it was Hood's turn. With three brigades from Lee's Army, MG John Bell Hood launched an attack at 3:30 pm. His assault followed earlier patterns, engaging Federals still further south from Thomas' original positions. He met with no greater success. Blunted by Wood (1/21) and Sheridan (3/20), a lull followed this last attack.

One more blow was struck on the evening of the 19th. About 6:00 pm, Cleburne's division of Hill's Corps arrived on the north flank, scene of the original fighting of that morning. Cleburne's 3 brigades launched a sunset attack which fared no better than any other Confederate assaults that day. The fighting ended after nightfall, with no gains made.

Bragg was responsible for the Confederate frustration of the 19th by failing to coordinate any of his numerous divisional assaults. In addition, he remained too far from the scene of the fighting to observe the opportunity Stewart's attack generated in the center. This assault actually breached the Federal line, but lack of supporting troops prevented any exploitation.

Although his troops had nearly broken the weak Union center and had made little headway against the strong Union left, Bragg was determined to follow his flanking plan again on the 20th. Longstreet had arrived with two more brigades from Virginia that night, and Bragg took the highly unusual measure of completely revising his command structure overnight. He chose to create two wings, with Longstreet leading one and Polk commanding the other. Theoretically, this would streamline the command problem, as each wing commander coordinated the actions of the divisions under his command to produce simultaneous results. Polk's wing, northernmost, was ordered to launch a dawn attack against Thomas in order to isolate the Federals from Chattanooga. Longstreet's instructions were to attack the Federals once Polk's forces had become engaged.

Longstreet managed to find Bragg, receive his orders and begin his preparations for the next day's fighting. Polk received his instructions from Bragg as well, but was less successful in informing his subordinates. Chief among them was Daniel Harvey Hill, who Polk could not find that night. (DH Hill was also a Lt General and equal in rank with the two wing commanders, but Bragg was displeased with Hill and merely left him as a corps commander under Polk.) Since Hill was to lead the dawn attack with his corps,

this was a most unfortunate oversight.

Much historical recrimination has ensued in trying to find blame for Polk's failure to attack on time, and there were mistakes made by all parties involved. However, Polk's failings must take precedence here, for he seems to have made only a lackadaisical effort to find Hill. The result delayed the attack until mid-morning.

By 9:00 am, Bragg was furious. No sounds of battle had greeted daylight, and the Confederate Commanding General at last went forward to find the cause. He found Polk awaiting breakfast, and Polk in turn informed Bragg that Hill was not yet ready to advance because his corps was drawing its own rations. To be fair to Hill, he had also expressed serious doubts about the positions of the attacking formations, finding them in some cases facing the wrong way. Polk passed on none of these concerns to Bragg.

Finally, in frustration, Bragg ordered the various division and brigade commanders to advance, even going so far at one point as to instruct an aide to ride along the battleline and order every company commander to attack. While that instruction was no doubt more figurative than literal, still this action resulted in a disjointed attack beginning around 10:00 am.

Not surprisingly, this complete lack of coordination produced a series of fruitless, brigade-sized piecemeal attacks along Thomas' Federal line, which was behind log breastworks and well supported with cannon. For more than an hour, these assaults produced nothing but Confederate losses. Ironically, the best chance for success was at the extreme north of the Union line where there hadn't been time to fully construct defensive positions. But rather than **finally** executing his original flanking plan, Bragg missed the opportunity and Thomas held easily.

Mishaps were to play their part for Federal fortunes as well. While Thomas was bearing the brunt of the Confederate effort, one of Rosecrans' aides reported to the Federal commander that a gap existed in his center. Recalling the problems of the previous day, Rosecrans quickly issued an order for Wood's division (1/21) to move north to plug the hole. Wood knew that this was an erroneous instruction because Brannan's men (3/14), concealed in the forest, blocked the supposed gap. However, Wood had received a dressing down earlier from Rosecrans for not responding promptly to an order and so hastened to comply. He put his men into column and marched behind Brannan. This left a good-sized gap where there had not been one.

It was at this moment, 11:00 am, that Longstreet's supporting attack opened. Longstreet had assembled a powerful force of 14 brigades, most of his wing, and was waiting for Polk's forces to open the action. Finally, he sent his troops forward, with the spearhead under Bushrod Johnson, aimed directly for Wood's newly created gap.

The question of how successful Longstreet's attack would have been had there been no hole to exploit is left open, though no one can dispute the power and depth of the attacking force. With the gap, the results were spectacular. Union troops were thrown into confusion and routed. Sheridan's division (3/20) made a series of desperate stands in an effort to delay the Confederate tide. Longstreet's reserves proved too powerful, however, and soon Federals were fleeing the field, catching up Rosecrans, Crittenden and McCook in the retreat. A total of four Union divisions were driven from the field, leaving only Thomas' force to oppose Bragg's suddenly victorious army.

Longstreet now faced a choice, either to pursue the fleeing half of the Federal army or to flank Thomas' Corps and crush the rest of the Army of the Cumberland. Without direction from Bragg, Longstreet elected to turn on Thomas, realizing he was deep in the Union 14 Corps' rear. Wheeling to the right, Longstreet prepared to attack again.

Now, around 12:30 pm, Wilder's brigade made a significant contribution to the battle. Wilder was almost caught up in the rout around him and soon found himself alone on the southern half of the field. Longstreet's entire wing separated his brigade from Thomas' command. Despite these daunting odds, Wilder chose to try and cut his way through the Confederate force, relying on the superior firepower of his Spencer repeating rifles to clear a path. His advance failed to reach all the way to Thomas, but Wilder did reach a point where he could cover the retreat of the rest of the army, and no doubt his force helped deter Longstreet from pursuit. At the same time, the Union Reserve Corps marched south to support Thomas as per earlier instructions.

By 1:00 pm, Longstreet's first troops began to attack the exposed Union flank. Desperately, the Federals stabilized a temporary line along Snodgrass Hill, comprised of Wood's and Brannan's men. As the Confederate assault grew stronger and threatened to overwhelm this thin line, Granger's Reserve Corps arrived to save the day.

The final hours of the battle saw desperate, bloody fighting as Thomas held

firm long enough to cover the troops retreating to Chattanooga. Negley's division (2/14), one of those which had fled, fell back to Rossville and defended the gap there, 4 or 5 miles north of the battlefield. One other division, Sheridan's (3/20) reached Rossville and attempted to return to the field via the Lafayette road, but growing uncertainty as to Thomas' exact positions and the approach of darkness halted this movement. Sheridan contented himself with supporting Negley.

Sometime during the afternoon, Rosecrans made the fatal decision that would ultimately cost him his command. Upon hearing that Thomas was not routed, but still holding fast, Rosecrans almost turned back to rejoin him. He then changed his mind and, displaying his great faith in Thomas' abilities, chose instead to go on to Chattanooga to reorganize the demoralized portion of his army. While this choice was perhaps correct militarily, it was fraught with political suicide. Misinterpreted as the actions of a man who had become completely confused and overwrought, Rosecrans' decision ultimately cost him his command.

By 5:30 pm, it had become impossible for Thomas to hold any longer and the Federals began to retreat towards Chattanooga. Still, their holding action had given Rosecrans time to start reorganizing his scattered men, and now Bragg gave him more time.

Despite all evidence to the contrary, Bragg considered himself the loser of the battle that evening. Considering his heavy losses in infantry, Bragg even contemplated his own withdrawal, until the unified and angry protests of his subordinates changed his mind. Most of the Confederate officers urged some sort of pursuit to capitalize on the victory. Not wanting to make another direct assault, Longstreet urged Bragg to outflank Chattanooga by crossing the Tennessee River and maneuvering Rosecrans out of position. Forrest felt that a direct pursuit that night would yield thousands of prisoners and perhaps complete Rosecrans' destruction.

Bragg chose to do nothing. Instead he elected to await developments and see if the Federals would withdraw further north. When it became apparent that the Yankees were going nowhere, the Confederate army advanced and took up besieging positions on the high ground surrounding the town.

Rosecrans was relieved of command a few weeks later, when Grant was sent by Lincoln to take command. Union troops from both the Eastern and Mississippi fronts were sent to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland, and in November Grant

conducted a series of battles which raised the siege and culminated in the Battle of Chattanooga, (also known as Missionary Ridge) which drove the Confederates off in defeat.

Despite the unified opposition of virtually every general officer in the Army of Tennessee, Bragg retained command after Chickamauga, managing to lay a great deal of the blame for errors made on that field on Generals Polk and Hill. Davis supported Bragg until the disastrous defeat at Chattanooga in November, when it finally became apparent even to the Southern President that Bragg had to go. As 1864 dawned, Joseph E. Johnston took command. Still, Bragg was not wholly discredited, for Davis made him his military advisor in Richmond.

Nevertheless, one of the real lost opportunities of the war was the failure for the Confederates to pursue after Chickamauga. Despite fearsome losses and the confusion of a major battle, by that late in the war the South could ill afford to waste any chance, however thin, for a decisive victory. A major victory, which returned the seat of war to Middle Tennessee, would have done much to promote Northern war-weariness and offset the disasters of the summer.

Designer Notes

In many ways, designing games is mostly a process of addressing "might-have-been" type questions. After all, much of the appeal of our hobby lies in assuming the commander's role and playing out your own decisions. Personally, I have found games to be great historical aids (living maps, as it were) as well as fun to play.

Given the above, when I started to work on Chickamauga I was determined to follow my own precedents and explore as many of the possibilities as I could. Hence the numerous optional troops and even alternative Confederate commanders included in the game.

Chickamauga was perhaps the last real Southern hope for victory in the field. 1864 still held open the possibility of a political victory through Northern war-weariness, but never again could the South conduct a strategic concentration like the one in the fall of 1863. Unfortunately for the Confederates, it proved a barren victory, marred by incompetence at army, corps, and divisional levels. Hence, not unlike "The Bulge" in WWII, I have always found this campaign especially fascinating, portraying kind of a last gasp for victory.

Each of the scenarios was created to examine a critical point of the fighting,

with special emphasis on the second day. The early scenarios are more balanced. I find scenarios 4 and 5 most interesting, focusing as they do on the collapse of Rosecrans' Army. The latter situations definitely favor the CSA, and in competitive play I recommend that the better or more experienced player handle the Federals.

This particular game has more special rules than most in the series, but it was a most unusual battle. I think that the Confederate command rules, while lengthy, aren't excessively complex and yet still capture the somewhat bizarre command arrangements Bragg created. The anti-initiative rules are, if anything, an oversimplification of the Byzantine undercurrents and subplots which ruined much of the Army of Tennessee's effectiveness. There was a strong lobby in the South to replace Bragg, and no doubt such a move would have impacted the battle. The times I have played with Lee in Bragg's place certainly make for a much more responsive army. There is more that could be done here, should players so choose. For instance, D H Hill would not necessarily have welcomed Lee unreservedly. Experiments might be conducted using a different set of anti-initiative ratings to mirror new resentments.

The restrictions imposed on Bragg when using the Wing command are imposed to reflect the historical political problems Bragg faced. Polk was unfit for higher command, but at Chickamauga still retained a large measure of army confidence. Bragg was also a stickler for the proper chain of command, and it took the major failure of his attack plan on the morning of the 20th to enrage him enough to finally bypass Polk. In effect, Bragg's required initiative dice-roll in this case reflects his growing annoyance at the delay, which finally boiled over when he started to order the divisional commanders of the RW forward independently. This rule can be easily ignored for players who feel too straight-jacketed by history. Nevertheless, I do hope players at least try it, and if at some point the Confederate player throws his hand in the air and begins to curse incoherently, "Welcome to the Confederate Army of Tennessee."

By now, followers of the series may also note that I tend not to rely on any fixed Attachment and Detachment rules. I have found that the various armies tended to cross-attach units based on the attitude of the commander and skills of the subordinates. Hence, these rules tend to model the command abilities of the corps commanders involved, as well as the actual handling of the troops involved. For instance, Thomas was a man Rosecrans trusted completely.

The 14th Corps commander at one point or another was placed in charge of almost every division in the Federal army and rarely commanded less than 2 attached divisions at any one time. I have restricted his command span to a maximum of 6 divisions since this seems to be the largest number he retained control of at any given moment, and to do more would completely circumvent the command and control rules. Nevertheless, I think the existing rules will allow the Union player to give Thomas a starring role, a fair representation of historical reality.

Confederate Cavalry in the West was more familiar with the stand-up fighting of the battlefield than their eastern counterparts, and so was better equipped to stand in the battleline. Forrest especially saw to it that his men were armed with rifled muskets where possible, and trained them extensively for dismounted combat. Hence, the Confederate horsemen here have their fire levels conforming to those of infantry instead of the more diluted levels occurring in previous games. As the war dragged on, both sides' mounted arms improved in this regard. Unfortunately, there were never enough carbines around to outfit the Confederates with weaponry equivalent to their blue-coated counterparts.

For matters of purely historical interest, I have included the final strengths of the units involved so that players can compare their game results to the actual outcome. I intend to continue to include this in all future releases, and I hope it is of interest to some gamers. Of course, the end strengths include only battle casualties, not straggler losses.

The victory conditions in this game, like the others I have designed, try to reflect only historical success. The levels of victory reflect how successful a player has been in light of historically valid objectives. Since both forces made some effort to destroy the other, terrain takes a back seat to comparative losses. In the end, the victory conditions will measure the difference in combat ability left in the two armies. Little consideration was made on my part to using the VP's as some sort of great leveling factor, to produce a "balanced" game. It is my belief that such a game is almost unattainable, given the vast diversity in player ability that exists in the hobby. Victory conditions that were successfully balanced between the Gamer's staff, or even a group of outside playtesters, are meaningless when two new people sit down to play. Hence, rather than pursue that Grail, I have elected to measure success in historical results. A player who achieves victory in **Barren Victory** has accomplished something that would have produced a decided historical advantage in 1863.

Player Notes

by Rod Miller

Barren Victory has a different flavor from previous **CWB** series games. Overall troop quality (morale) is a little lower. Thus, the forces have less short term staying power (more stragglers causing wrecked status to be reached quicker). Brigades retreat more frequently, Corps "stop attack" earlier, etc. This causes the battle situation to change rapidly, creating an exciting and uncertain, back and forth environment.

Certainly the troop balance and the relative command quality of the armies are different from previous games. Further, the command structures of the two armies are somewhat unique—both rewarding and frustrating.

Finally, the heavily wooded terrain, with abundant streams, creates an entirely new battle situation. Control of the roads, important in previous games, is **critical** here. Command and control will be difficult to maintain, the word "tangled" will be a frequent description. Tactically, casualties will run heavy as close-range combat is often the only type possible. The offensive player will find the going rough as many of the retreats he is forced into will preclude any return fire, and he will be even more hard-pressed to bring supporting artillery to bear. The defending line will be plagued by a lack of mobility (especially of his artillery), slow reaction to trouble, and difficulty maintaining organization.

Each army has their distinct strengths and weaknesses which change as the battle progresses. Whichever side you command, you'll find the game to be competitive, challenging, closely-fought, tense and bloody—Just like the battle!

Union

The Union army is generally on the defensive in this battle, although by no means exclusively so. It is not an easy defense, since the 3 "victory point" entry areas are so widely spread apart. If you can bottle up the Confederate forces on the southwest area of the field, the defense of your entry areas is much easier. Thus you may want to follow that old adage "the best defense is a good offense."

Assuming you can hold your VP areas, victory will be based on casualties. This Union army simply doesn't have the manpower to absorb excessive or disproportionate casualties. Keep an eye on losses with every decision. Holding a particular

area at the cost of wrecking a corps is rarely effective.

It is **extremely** hard to disengage, withdraw and reorganize a defensive line in this terrain. As heartless as it sounds, sometimes that Dg brigade or stranded artillery unit has to be "hung out to dry" in order to get the rest of the line back into an organized and better defensive position. Be alert and anticipate: it is better to get out too soon, than too late.

The Union's main advantage in the game is its command edge. Although Rosecrans-Crittenden-McCook are not very good, Thomas is tremendous. He can command nearly half of the Union army, using his excellent initiative to allow Rosecrans to concentrate his attentions on the rest of the army. You should try to keep the battle in a fluid and changing situation (particularly early), since your command structure will be able to react more quickly. Ideally, you would like to get Crittenden and McCook in a relatively stable situation—not necessarily static—while Thomas rapidly reacts, counterattacks and "runs circles around" the Confederates, producing locally overwhelming force and destroying them in detail (so to speak, no one "runs" through this terrain). Use your strengths to full advantage, while minimizing your weaknesses and you can win.

Confederate

As the Confederate player, you have several major pluses at Chickamauga. You have better quality troops than the Union, **more** troops, an initial advantage in deployment, position advantages, well-armed cavalry to use in battle, Longstreet, Hood, Forrest, D.H. Hill, Cleburne, etc.

But don't get too cocky—you've also got Bragg and Polk. So the battle shapes up as a close one, as these guys will have difficulty controlling anything, much less an offensive effort. (Your longtime Union opponent might say its about time **you** got to enjoy the pleasure of such commanders.) Bragg must take a very active role in command and issue his orders In-Person. These results will be dismal enough. If you want even more frustration, try parking Bragg in his HQ (which he located too far from the action) and direct the battle from there, as he did historically. Even with your best command efforts, your army will delay for painfully long times—be prepared for it, plan with this in mind, and issue orders such that these delays are taken into account.

Bragg failed to win anything more than a minor victory because he failed to coordinate his army's attacks, failed to take

advantage of opportunities as they presented themselves, and failed to **execute** his plan which could have worked. These errors and other mistakes (frontal assaults, poor choices of attacks, etc.), contributed greatly to the excessive casualties which seriously damaged his army's effectiveness. Learn from his mistakes—don't repeat them.

Even though the Confederate army seemingly has the manpower to "bull" its way through the Union troops in bloody frontal assaults, this will get you results not much different from Bragg's. This temptation will be especially hard to resist since you finally have more men than he does and relative to previous situations it will seem as if you have overwhelming power. But you really don't, and you can't waste them here either. And you won't be able to count on the Union commander pulling a division out of line, leaving a "juicy" gap for you to hammer and drive nearly half the Union army off the field.

Once in the Wing structure, Longstreet will do most of the fighting and Polk a lot of sitting—and drive you crazy. As with the Union army's 20 & 21 Corps, you'd like to get Polk in a situation where he can be productive without having to change his orders, while Longstreet is your fast acting arm. When Bragg gets frustrated enough to bypass Polk, the command systems of the two armies are remarkably similar. The key is having enough effective forces left at this point **and** having enough time to do something with them.

While the Confederate player has an army good enough to win this battle, there are more than enough problems here to prevent victory. A well planned, properly conducted battle is required to win, something less will lose.

Union Personality Sheet

William S. Rosecrans, Major General, Commander, Army of the Cumberland

Rating: 1

Starting Army Status: 3

Anti-Initiative: None

Background:

Rosecrans took command of the Union Army of the Ohio, subsequently renamed the Army of the Cumberland, after Major General Buell's poor performance during the Perryville campaign. Afterwards, the army became the most inactive of the Federal forces, fighting only the Battle of Murfreesboro (Stones' river) in December of 1862. However, the initial maneuvering which drove Bragg out of Chattanooga was masterful, forcing Bragg to surrender that important city without a battle. On the 19th of September, Bragg counterattacked just south of the city. The first day's fighting was inconclusive, but on the second day, Longstreet arrived and launched a decisive attack which drove half of Rosecrans' army from the field. Thomas, who held on until dark, retreated with the rest of the Union troops at the end of the day. Bragg followed, and the Federals soon found themselves besieged in Chattanooga. A month or so later, Grant was brought in to remedy the situation, and Rosecrans was relieved of command.

Panic Rolls:

# of wrecked divisions =	0-3	4-6	7-8	9-10	11-12
Status of 2	12	11	9	8	7
Status of 1	10	8	7	6	5

Modifiers: +2 to the dice roll if Thomas is killed or wounded

On Panic:

If Rosecrans panics, he has determined that only immediate retreat to Chattanooga can preserve the army. Rosecrans orders all Federal units (of all types) within 30 hexes of the Army HQ, **except** those units currently commanded by Thomas (including units attached to the 14th Corps) to exit the map via hexes G, H, I, J, or K. These orders are automatically issued by Rosecrans on the first command phase after panic has occurred, ignoring order costs. The retreat orders are never lost and automatically accepted.

Each division commander may make one and only one attempt to change these orders by rolling for initiative. A successful roll allows that division, plus one artillery unit from that corps, to remain on the field and join any Union troops still fighting. Failure means that the division complies with Rosecrans orders and leaves the game with its corps. The Union 20th and 21st Corps commanders may also roll once to see if they stay, but success only means that the Corps HQ, Leader and supply stay. Each division still rolls individually. Wilder's independent brigade is automatically exempt from these orders and may elect to join Thomas or leave the map as desired.

Any troops that remain on the field may, at any later time, elect to withdraw. This order does not need to be rolled for, but once invoked may not later be changed.

If Thomas is a casualty at the time of the panic result, then his effect is **ignored entirely** and **all** Union troops within 30 hexes of the Army HQ are subject to panic. Each leader may still roll to remain on the field, as described above.

In all cases, units more than 30 hexes away may stand or retreat entirely at their own option.

When Rosecrans panics and leaves the field, the Union player is left without an army commander. None of the remaining corps commanders may assume temporary army command. Thus, after Panic has occurred, **any** Federal troops which remain on the field must use **initiative** to issue orders of any kind.

Panic Demands:

Rosecrans may make two (2) panic demand on Bragg (or his replacement) in scenario 6 [the whole battle]. One (1) panic demand may be made in scenarios 1 - 5.

Confederate Personality Sheet

Braxton Bragg, General, Commander, Army of Tennessee

Rating: 0

Starting Army Status: 3

Anti-Initiative: Polk, Walker: -1
Longstreet: 0
All others: -2

Background:

By the time of Chickamauga, Bragg had proven his unfitnes to command to virtually everyone except Confederate President Davis, a close friend. The Perryville campaign in the fall of 1862 was a horribly managed affair, begun brilliantly but ending on a sour note of defeat and withdrawal. Murfreesboro was at best a hollow victory, with the success of the first day thrown away by the tragic slaughter of Breckinridge's troops on January 2nd, 1863. Finally, by allowing Rosecrans to outmaneuver him in front of Chattanooga, Bragg lost the last of the confidence of his subordinates had for him. Desperate for a victory, Bragg led his army to Chickamauga Creek, strongly reinforced from other theaters. The South did indeed win the battle, but again mismanagement marred success. Casualties were horrendous, and Bragg himself was convinced that he had been defeated on the evening of the 20th. Finally, after the disaster in November at Chattanooga itself, Bragg was relieved of field command. Still, Davis retained enough respect for the man to bring him to Richmond and make him an advisor.

Panic Rolls:

# of wrecked divisions=	0-2	3-5	6-8	9-10	11-12	13+
Status of 2	12	11	10	9	8	7
Status of 1	11	10	9	8	7	6

Modifiers: +1 to the dice roll if Longstreet is killed/wounded

On Panic:

If Bragg panics, he has decided the battle is lost and only retreat behind the mountain ridges of north Georgia can save the army from destruction. All Confederate troops must immediately retreat off-map via any road hex leading off the east edge of either map. These orders are automatically issued by Bragg on the first command phase after panic is triggered, ignoring order costs. These orders are never lost and automatically accepted by the receivers. However, before acting on these orders, each Wing commander (or Corps commander, if the Wing structure is not in effect) may roll once on the initiative table to ignore the retreat orders, if he so chooses. If the roll fails, the orders are acted on normally. For this roll, **and this roll only**, ignore the anti-initiative ratings.

Panic Demands:

Bragg may make two (2) panic demands on Rosecrans in scenario 6. He may make one (1) demand on Rosecrans in scenarios 1, 2, 3 & 4. In scenario 5 Union panic has already occurred.

Alternative Panic Rolls:

Since it is possible to replace Bragg with either Johnston or Lee by using a variant, use the following modifiers when checking for panic. Only the panic rolls are changed, the other rules pertaining to Southern panic remain the same.

For Johnston: Use the Panic Table above with NO modifiers.

For Lee: Use the Panic Table above with a -1 Die Roll Modifier.

The Longstreet modifier remains the same in either case.

Scenario Starting Strengths

The following chart provides the starting strengths for the various units at the beginning of each scenario. Units with no strength listed are considered to be at full strength. Additionally, a unit may have a parenthesized number following its current starting strength, which is the number of stragglers the unit now has. Stragglers may be recovered, but no strength may be regained above the starting strength. The ending strength column is presented purely for historical interest and has no bearing on any scenario. It merely represents the strength remaining in the ranks at the end of the game on the 20th.

Example:

1/1/14 starts Scenario 2 with a strength of 15(2). Its original strength was 19, so X off four spaces for losses. The two (2) stragglers are then marked off with an /. Thus 1/1/14 starts Scenario 2 with 13 strength steps, and may recover two from stragglers.

Note: All units start Scenarios 1 and 6 at full strength.

Union						Confederate					
Unit	Scenarios				Ending Strength	Unit	Scenarios				Ending Strength
	2	3	4	5		2	3	4	5		
1/1/14	15(2)	15	13(1)	13	12	J/C/P	11	10	10	10	9
2/1/14	13(1)	13	11	11	10	S/C/P	8(2)	8	8	8	8
3/1/14	8(5)	8	7(2)	7	6	M/C/P	9(2)	8	8	8	8
1/2/14			10(1)	10	9	W/C/P	10(3)	9	9	9	9
2/2/14			11	11	10	St/C/P	8(1)	8	8	8	8
3/2/14			14(1)	14	13	A/H/P			17(1)	13	
1/3/14	11	11	10(1)	9(1)	9	D/H/P			17	12	
2/3/14	19	19	18	17	13	M/H/P			22(1)	18	
3/3/14	13	13	12	11	9	W/C/H		18	13(1)	11	
2/4/14	15(1)	15	15	13(1)	13	P/C/H	14	13	11(1)	10	
3/4/14	10	10	10	9	9	D/C/H			15	13	
Wldr				24	24	H/Br/H		13	11	9	
2/1/20		10	10	6(4)	6	A/Br/H		11	10(1)	8	
3/1/20		10	10	5(3)	5	S/Br/H		8	7	6	
1/2/20	11	10	9	9	8	G/W/Res		5	3(1)	3	
2/2/20	9(2)	8	8	8	6	E/W/Res	9(2)	9	9	7(2)	7
3/2/20	12(1)	11	11	11	9	W/W/Res	6(3)	6	6	5(1)	5
1/3/20				8(2)	8	L/L/Res	14(4)	14	14	11(3)	10
2/3/20				7(2)	7	W/L/Res	14(3)	14	14	10(2)	10
3/3/20		14	14	10(3)	10	B/S/B		8	8	6	6
1/1/21		12	12	10(1)	7	Br/S/B		9	9	9	9
3/1/21		13	13	12	10	C/S/B		11	11	9	9
1/2/21	12	12	11	10	10	G/P/B		20	20	20	14
2/2/21	13	13	12	10(1)	10	T/P/B		12	12	12	12
3/2/21	16	15	14	12	12	3/P/B					9
1/3/21		13	13	11(1)	11	J/JPD/1		6	6	5	5
2/3/21		9	9	8	8	G/JPD/1		9	9	8	8
3/3/21		11	11	9(1)	9	M/JPD/1		10	10	9(1)	7
1/1/Res					13	K/M/1				13(1)	10
2/1/Res					6	H/M/1				8	7
3/1/Cav					10	L/H/1		12	12	12	10
1/2/Cav					12	B/H/1		7	7	7	5
2/2/Cav					7	Tex/H/1		10	10	7(1)	5
						D/P/FCv	10	10	10	10	10
						S/P/FCv	8	8	8	8	8

Union Order of Arrival

Time	Area	Units	(Orders)
19 Sept			
7:30 am	A	4/14, 14b	(1)
10:30 am	A	2/20, 20b	(2)
11:00 am	A	1/20, 20b	(2)
11:30 am	A	Rosecrans, Army HQ & Supply	
12:30 am	A	3/20, 20b	(3)
	A	McCook, 20 Corps HQ & Supply	(4)
2:00 pm	A	2/14, 14b	(1)
3:00 pm	A	Mitchell, Cav Corps HQ & Supply, 1/Cav	5
20 Sept			
10:00 am	A	Crook, 2/2/Cav, Cavb	(5)

Union Orders Explanations:

1. Move to Corps HQ and await further orders.
2. Move to 14 Corps HQ and take further orders from same
3. 3/20 has been given a divisional goal to move to Lee & Gordon's Mill and defend the crossing.
4. McCook is to move to the current location of **either** 1/20 and 2/20 **or** 3/20. The Corps orders then become the same as the division(s) to which McCook moved, and 1/20 & 2/20 are returned to 20 Corps authority.
5. Move to Jackson House (B7.10) and await further orders.

Confederate Order of Arrival

Time	Area	Units	(Orders)
19 Sept			
1:30 pm	D	Hill, H Corps HQ & Supply, C/H, Hb	(1)
4:00 pm	C	Br/H, Hb	(2)
10:00 pm	E	Longstreet, LW HQ,(3) M/1	(6)
20 Sept			
4:00 am	E	Gist, G/W/Res	(4)
2:30 pm	C	WCav Corps (all)	(5)
Optional Arrivals			
19 Sept			
9:00 am	E	St/—, St/—b	(1)
10:30 am	E	Lo/—, Lo/—b	(1)
10:00 pm	E	W/M/1, B/M/1, J/H/1, A/H/1	(6)

Confederate Orders Explanations:

1. Move to Army HQ and await further orders
2. Br/H has a Divisional goal to move to Lee and Gordon's Mill and defend the crossing.
3. LW HQ and Longstreet are to move to Army HQ and await further orders. M/1 is to move to join 1 Corps
4. Move to join the Res Corps.
5. Move to Lee and Gordon's Mill and defend the crossing.
6. Move to join 1 Corps.

If the specified entry hex is blocked, the arrivals are delayed 1 turn and may appear, in line or column, on the map edge within 5 hexes of the listed hex.

Rules Questions? Let Us Help!

Call (217) 896-2145 during business hours (or take your chances at other times.) Be sure to have your rules handy. Clarifications or explanations as needed. We are dedicated to serving your gaming needs, and product support is one of the ways!

Help is only a phone call away.

or Write:
The Gamers, Inc.
500 W. 4th Street
Homer, IL 61849

The Gamers

Questions are usually answered the day they are received.