Napoleonic Battle Series:

Talavera

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Introduction

Talavera is a game of the battle fought on the 27th and 28th of July 1809 just north of Talavera in western Spain. It was fought between King Joseph Bonaparte's French army and the uneasily united Anglo-Spanish armies under Wellesley and Cuesta and marked the culmination of Wellesley's first attempt to challenge the French hold on central Spain. The battle was a fiercely fought affair and despite the fact that the Allies managed to withstand the furious French attacks and win a victory of sorts, lack of supplies and the appearance of Soult's Army in the Allied rear soon forced the British to retire back to Portugal.

1.0 General Rules

1.1 Counters

The units of the different nationalities that took part in the battle are colored as follows:

Spanish: Yellow with Bright Red Icon British: Red with Dark Blue Icon Kings German Legion (KGL): Red with Black Icon

French: Light Blue with Dark Blue Icon



Rheinbund Germans: (In this case Frankfort, Hesse-Darmstadt, Westphailan and Baden troops.): Light Blue with Light Green Icon

Dutch: Light Blue with Orange Icon Polish: Light Blue with Dark Blue Icon King Joseph's Spanish Guard: Light Blue with Yellow Icon

Units are named after either their brigadier or the largest regiment in it. Commanders' names are written in italics and regimental names are in normal style. "Allies" in these rules refer to the British and Spanish armies as a whole.

1.2 The Terrain

A few geographical notes might be useful here. We are 100 kilometers west of Madrid. In Spain. The Tajo (Tagus) River runs east to west through Western Spain and reaches the Atlantic at Lisbon. The Madrid Road, the only decent road on the game map, runs the same general course as the Tajo. The Alberche, which flows down from the north, reaches the Tajo about fifteen hexes south of the map and the Madrid road crosses the Alberche some ten hexes south of Casa de Salinas.

1.2a The Tajo Bridge. The massive Puente da Santa Catalina bridge spanning the Tajo is huge enough to be one elevation level high. Units may only enter and leave the bridge at the end-points and may not stack with, nor pass through, or be passed through by, other units while on it. (Commanders, Skirmishers and HQ's are excepted from this.) Furthermore, artillery may not unlimber on the bridge and Infantry must be in column in order to enter or move along it.

1.2b Olive Groves. Olive Groves function as Orchard/Vineyard for all purposes (most of them are Ilex-shrubs, anyway). This means that the map has three types of terrain with exactly the same effect, but we thought it would be nice for players to know what they are entangled in.

1.2c The Sunken Road & The Pajar de Vergara. The Sunken Road & the The Pajar de Vergara redoubt counts as Orchards for movement purposes and lets defending infantry lines, skirmishers and unlimbered artillery enjoy the "Defending in Fortified terrain: +1" modifier on check to stand rolls as long as attacks are directed across the "sunken" or "pointed" edges. Moving along the sunken road counts as moving along an ordinary road. (The Pajar de Vergara was an uncompleted redoubt on a slight knoll and the excavated earth had simply been thrown forward to create a bank 3 or 4 feet high.)

1.2d Minor Buildings, "Points of Interest". Only the building hexes inside or adjacent to the Talavera City Wall and the Casa de Salinas and Nuesta Senora del Prado hexes are solid enough to be treated as Town/Village. No other buildings have any effect on the game.

1.2e The City Wall. Talavera's 15th century walls were in bad shape. But they were still useful for defense, especially since breaching them is beyond the perspective of this game. Units can only cross the wall through gate hex sides, treating the gate as if it was a bridge for close combat purposes. Fire or close combats can not be directed through wall hexsides.

1.3 Infantry Training

No Spanish or British infantry unit may use Combat Column. All French units can, regardless of actual nationality.

2.0 Spanish Special Rules

These rules treat the Spanish Army of Extremadura as a part of the British army, but note that this is just an arrangement necessary for the Command Rules to work. Captain-General Don Gregorio García de la Cuesta was not subordinated to anyone and was at odds with Wellesley on just about everything.

2.1 General


For command purposes the Army of Extremadura is treated as one huge corps. It will suffer a Corps Emergency Retreat if the Extremaduran Army HQ is overrun. Spanish artillery may move freely within range of either Army HQ or Divisional Commanders. Furthermore Cuesta accepts engage-type orders with a -4 modifier instead of the normal -2.

No British unit may be attached to the Army of Extremadura. Spanish Divisions may only be given Independent Orders by initiative or the "borrowing-process" outlined in Rule 2.4. The only exception to this is that Wellesley may give two Cavalry Brigades Independent Orders while ignoring the borrowing procedure.

Should Cuesta become a casualty, Alburquerque takes over command, followed by Henestrosa. Cuesta's successor inherits all of Cuesta's limitations and habits save for the wagon.

2.2 Spanish Troops

2.2a Spanish Cavalry. Spanish cavalry units must always pass a Morale Check before conducting a charge or opportunity charge against an enemy cavalry unit. If it fails the test the cavalry just stays in place. It may try to charge other units later in the turn.



2.2b Spanish Unease. The Spanish Army kept a weary eye on their British colleagues. Should at any time three British divisions be wrecked all Spanish units add an extra morale reduction to each morale reduction suffered during combat, so that an M-1 becomes M-2, M+2 becomes M+1 etc. A combat result without a morale change is unchanged (for example, if the combat result was 1(2) it does NOT become 1(2)M-1).

2.3 "La tartana de Cuesta"

General Cuesta was 69 years old and so ill that he could only ride if servants held him in the saddle. During the Talavera campaign he traveled in a black wagon pulled by nine mules and a month after the battle he suffered a stroke that forced his retirement. Hence Cuesta moves as a limbered foot artillery unit with 7 movement points instead of a Leader's normal 14. For obvious reasons Cuesta may not lead cavalry charges.

2.4 Borrowing Divisions

Wellesley may issue orders to Spanish Divisional Commanders, but such an order must be accepted both by the Divisional Commander in question as well as Cuesta before anything is done about it. Calculate all order handling, including arrival time, as if the order were sent to the Divisional Commander only, but when checking for acceptance make a separate roll for Cuesta on the Acceptance Table as if the order were sent to him as well. Note that Cuesta's -4 shift on engage orders apply here as well.

For each Division Wellesley borrows after the first, Cuesta also suffers a further -1 on the Acceptance Table and should he throw away an order, the Divisional Commander's order is canceled as well and Wellesley may not try to issue orders to that particular division again. One Spanish Artillery unit may be borrowed along with each division.

Example: Wellesley wants the 4th Spanish Division to move to Valdefuentes and therefore issues a General AW order to Manglano for the cost of six command points. This is the first Spanish Division Wellesley issues orders to. Two turns later the order reaches Manglano and at the same time Cuesta hears about it. Both Manglano and Cuesta now rolls for acceptance, Manglano on the "3" column (Manglano+AW+General+Wellesley) and

Cuesta on the "4" column (Cuesta+AW+ General+Wellesley). Manglano roll 23, a D6 result and Cuesta 63, an A result. This means that Cuesta has agreed to release the Division but that it still might take some time for Manglano to get going.

Once a Spanish Division accepts a order from Wellesley and is released by Cuesta it can accept new orders from Wellesley without Cuesta interfering. Wellesley can also order a Division to return to Cuesta and if the Division returns to Cuesta in unwrecked condition, the -1 on the Acceptance Table for that Division being borrowed does no longer apply.

Wellesley may apply to Cuesta in person by issuing the order while stacked with Cuesta. Cuesta then handles his part of the order as an IPO order but does not roll for acceptance until the Order has reached the Divisional Commander as well.

2.5 Enough!

(Campaign Scenarios Only)

At the start of any Allied 28th July turn when the Allied player has three or more Spanish Divisions and not more than one British Division wrecked he may proclaim that Cuesta has decided that he has had enough (Of Wellesley, The French and The World In General.). By doing so the Extremaduran Army automatically accepts an order to leave the battlefield and must exit the map either at 1.09 or 3.01 (not both) as quickly as possible. If this order is carried out successfully, that is, all Spanish units has left the map (by any kind of movement or by being destroyed) the French player will receive no Victory Points for wrecking Spanish Divisions. The Allied player will on the other hand receive one Victory Point for each Spanish Division that manages to leave the board, with all its components, in an unwrecked state, as well as one point for each two Spanish gun points that manages to leave the board.

Note that Spanish units cannot recover stragglers once they have left the board, nor do so on the board once the retreat order has been accepted.

Divisions borrowed by Wellesley when Cuesta accepts this order may elect to ignore the retreat order and instead keep on functioning as a Division directly subordinated to Wellesley. Division that stays with Wellesley is handled normally when it comes to victory-point calculations.

3.0 British Special Rules

3.1 General

All British Divisions operate on Independent Orders only. Cavalry Brigades may be given Independent Orders, but no other unit may be detached. British artillery may move freely within range of either Army HQ or Divisional Commanders.

Should Wellesley become a casualty, the British commitment to the Iberian peninsula is for all purposes doomed, but in a shorter perspective Sherbrooke takes over command, followed by Hill. Wellesley's replacement(s) can not use rule 3.4.

3.2 The KGL

The Pseudo-German units of the Kings German Legion are for all purposes considered "British".

3.3 Light Infantry

All A morale British skirmishers are considered to be armed with Rifles. These Skirmishers may move up to three hexes away from the nearest friendly unit.

3.4 Wellesley's Command Style

Wellesley commanded in a very "handson" manner and habitually bypassed the chain of command to move troops around by himself. Hence Wellesley may move a brigade by moving with it, provided that he started the Movement phase stacked with the brigade. During these movements units may ignore all order, command-radius and stoppage issues. While moving brigades, Wellesley himself only pays Leader MP's for the movement between hexes, not for such things as formation changes and once the brigade's MP's are exhausted he may move on.

Once abandoned by Wellesley a brigade may only move to enter close combat or to hobble back into its proper division's range. Should the brigade moved by Wellseley be stacked with its Divisional commander the commander must either immediately move back to his other brigades or tag along with Wellesley and in effect shift the position of the entire division. Should the division be shifted in this way it loses any orders it might have had and is instead considered to have "defend in place" orders.

3.5 Off to Dinner!

(Campaign Scenarios Only)

The higher British officers had an alarming tendency to "stroll off" as soon as things calmed down. Therefore, as soon as night falls on the 27th (9:00 p.m.), the whereabouts of all British divisional commanders not under accepted engage orders become questionable and stays so until the 5:00 a.m. turn. If the French should start a new attack on any part of the Allied army during the night roll one die for each British divisional commander not under accepted engage orders. The roll takes place at the start of a French Close Combat Phase in which combat takes place. On a roll of one the commander is removed from play and reappears again with any unit of his division on the next French game turn. On a roll of two, three or four the commander is moved to hex 11.07 and must move to join any unit of his division (in order to become "bolted to the ground") in the Allied player's turn. On a roll of five or six the commander is present with his division. Note that carrying out movement orders and rolling for delay reduction might be done without canceling out this rule. The only thing that does so is if combat in general "carries over" from the dusk turns into the night (a few bickering skirmishers are not enough). In this case this rule is ignored.

Note that there are several ways to abuse and deliberately defuse this rule and if players feel they are likely to do so they should ignore it altogether.

4.0 French Special Rules

4.1 General

The I and IV Corps can operate any of their divisions on Independent Orders but may never cross-attach divisions between them. The Beamont-1 brigade may operate either on Independent Orders or be attached to any of I Corps' Divisions. Cav-IV brigades may operate either on Independent Orders or be attached to any of I Corps' Divisions Dessolles' division and the two dragoon divisions must operate on Independent Orders issued via Jourdan (or initiative) and the Royal Guard is controlled by 4.4 below. The DR artillery unit must stay within range of either one of the two Dragoon Divisions and the Army artillery units may move freely within range of any Commander in the army.

Should Joseph become a casualty, Jourdan takes over command, followed by Victor, both functioning as perfectly normal Army commanders. Should Jourdan be killed while Joseph is still alive he is not replaced and 4.2b ceases to be in effect. Otherwise all personal restrictions in 4.2 die with its owner.

4.2 The French Command

The French army's command structure was a mess. The bright, but utterly unmilitary as well as un-charismatic King Joseph I ("The Usurper," to the Spanish.) was in charge, aided by his sulking, but highly capable, advisor Jourdan. These two were both far from the battle when it started and they where constantly harassed by the inspired and temperamental Victor who had his own ideas of how things should be done, as well as a way of initiating actions and then demanding support for them. The following rules reflect this situation.

- **4.2a** Joseph may never leave the Army HQ and may only issue In-Person Orders. Dubious as his status might have been he is in command and if he is not on board in any scenario the French player is left to get orders by initiative. Also see 4.3 & 4.4.
- **4.2b** Jourdan may roam the board freely but may not lead attacks of any kind or use initiative. Jourdan can be used to transmit orders from Joseph to commanders that Joseph (by being limited to IPV orders at HQ) can not reach. This is done by Jourdan first accepting the order himself, then moving to the commander in question and then "re-issuing" the order for a new round of acceptance. When Jourdan re-issues an order he uses his own command rating, not Joseph's. Jourdan may only transmit one order at a time.

4.2c When acting on initiative, Victor checks for corps stoppage as if he was a "0" rated commander. This does not apply to Independent Orders Victor has issued to his subordinates by using initiative.

4.3 Joseph's Remote Control

(Campaign Scenarios Only)

Starting at 8:00 p.m on the 27th and until he enters the map Joseph may attempt to control his army from off-map. He may issue one order per turn to any formation already on the map. Compute the arrival times for these orders by adding the time needed to move from hex 62.05 to the recipient to a number of turns equal to the roll of one die. Example: It takes two turns for an order to move from 62.05 to Ruffin's Division at the 33.17crossroads. Adding a die roll of "4" will mean that it will take a total of six turns for the orders to reach Ruffin.

4.4 The Royal Guard

Joseph is the Royal Guard Division's Divisional Commander. This means that since these units must remain within range of Joseph they are also tied to the Army HQ and need no separate orders to tag along with it.

4.5 Sebastiani

Since Lefebvre had been sent to Germany in February Sebastiani commanded the IV Corps as well as his own division while waiting for Ney to show up and take command. The units of the 1-4 Div may therefore treat either Sebastiani or the Corps HQ (when Sebastiani needs to leave for Army HQ) as their divisional commander, but all units must trace to the same counter on any given turn.



4.6 The Royal Road

(Campaign Scenarios Only)

From 8:00 pm on the 27th the French player must keep all units of one un-wrecked division on or adjacent to the road to Madrid between 15.05 and 25.01 to guard the French rear against Spanish forays. Initially the 2nd Dragoon Reserve division fulfills this requirement upon entry but may be replaced by another division. Should the division guarding the road be attacked in any way the French player is released from the requirements of this rule for the rest of the game.

5.0 Variants

5.1 The Classics

Some people feel that a simulation of Talavera would not be complete without rules handling two famous freak incidents of the battle. For those, here are rules for Ansons's spectacular charge into a ditch and the widespread Spanish panic on the evening of the 27th. None of them carries any Victory Point penalties.

5.1a Ditch!! At any one time a charging British cavalry unit enters a new hex the French (or Spanish - if such a person is around) player may call out "Ditch!" The cavalry unit is disorganized, takes hits equal to the roll of one die and the charge ends. It is proper for the target unit to still form square and look surprised while the chargers take a dive.

5.1b Treason!! At any one time before 11 pm on the 27th the French player may call out "Treason!" provided there are currently no French units within six hexes of any Spanish one. Designate one Spanish D or E morale infantry unit that for reasons unknown has to check morale and if it fails it suffers a M-2 result and has to retreat 2 hexes. After the (very likely) retreat has been carried out all units that are or have been adjacent to the retreating unit during any part of its retreat must take a morale check and risk the same result. The players are now free to spend as much time as needed to explain why this happened.

5.2 Craufurd Arrives

Despite marching 65 kilometers in 26 hours Robert Craufurd and his soon to be legendary Light Brigade arrived at Talavera a day too late for the battle. This variant suggests that Craufurd's men did march even faster than they did.

Beginning at 10:00am on the 28th the British player rolls two dice at the start of his command phase. On a roll of 12 Craufurd and the optional 2Lh arrive at hex 01.09. They are under orders to move to Army HQ and await further orders. This variant does not cost any Victory Points.

5.3 French Command Variants

Historically the arguing French Commanders did cancel each other out in a fashion. These variants assume one of them gains the upper hand and replaces all parts of rule 4.1 above. None of these variants cost any Victory Points.

- **5.3a** If Joseph tries harder to enforce his will. Jourdan will be removed from play in disgust. All other likewise disgusted French officers have their ratings reduced by one when rolling for initiative and stoppage. Joseph may still not leave the Army HQ but may send Aide-delivered orders The restraints on Victor's initiatives 4.2c remains in effect.
- **5.3b** If Joseph persuades Jourdan to handle things, Jourdan will function as a perfectly normal Army Commander while Joseph will function as just a Royal Guard Divisional Commander, still bound to the Army HQ. Meanwhile the sulking Victor's Command Rating is reduced to 2.
- **5.3c** With Victor allowed to lead the proceedings Jourdan is once again removed and Joseph functions as per 4.2a. Victor then takes over Jourdan's role as messenger in 4.1b, keeps on commanding his own corps and may use initiative to issue IPV orders to any French division. (Schizophrenic, yes, a lot, but Victor on a roll would probably have tried it.)

5.4 Cuesta and Myth

Most explanations of why the Anglo-Spanish operation on the Tajo failed centers on Cuesta's behaviour. That is, a lot of non-Spanish explanations do. Meanwhile a lot of Spanish material has gone a long way to excuse Cuesta and blame the whole thing on Wellesley. These two variants are for those who want to examine the Cuesta Myth in detail. Both of these variants gives the Allied player three Victory Points.

5.4a Cuesta, Misunderstood. Cuesta was a fair commander who has been unjustly blamed for everything that went wrong in the Talavera Campaign. He can not be blamed for Wellesley being an arrogant, uncooperative control-freak.

Ignore rule 2.3 and raise Cuesta's Command Rating to 3. No British Commanders may roll for initiative and Wellesley may not send orders directly to Cuesta. The ignored Cuesta may only get orders by using initiative and may use that to issue Independent Orders to his divisions.

5.4b Cuesta, Moron. Cuesta was the worst excuse for a General history has seen and his erratic and deceitful ways was the cause of all Allied problems during the campaign.

All normal rules apply and the Spanish



- army, Cuesta included, may never roll for initiative. Furthermore, roll two dice each British Command Phase and check the following table.
- 2-9 Absolutely nothing happens. Cuesta is oblivious to the world.
- 10 One randomly determined Spanish Division throws away its current order.
- 11 One randomly determined Spanish division has accepted Independent Orders to withdraw into Talavera. If a Division gets this result a second time it is ordered to cross the Tajo bridge and leave the map to the south.
- 12 One randomly determined Spanish division has accepted Independent Orders to attack the nearest French formation.

5.5 Wilson For Real

The epitome of "pluck," Lt-Col Robert Wilson, and his Lusitanian Legion were, together with some Spanish units, operating northeast of Talavera. In real life Wilson was one roadless mountain range away and was therefore ignored (or not even noticed) by the French, but this variant assumes that he did manage to cause some commotion along the Madrid Road. The French player is deprived of Dessolles' Division and gains 1 Victory Point. (Spanish supremacists may rename this variant "Venegas For Real." In that case Venegas is making good progress south of Madrid and Dessolles is assumed to have been sent back to help out.)

5.6 The Zaya's Mystery

Most sources have the Duke del Parque at the battle, but some claim he was not fit to lead the 1st Division. Yet other sources has him at Ciudad Rodrigo (or Trujillo) raising a new army. Most of the former sources agree that a Maj-Gen P. G. Zayas filled in for the Duke. To fully explore the implications of this players can use either "del Parque" or "P. G. Zayas" (on the other side of the counter) to command the division.

Another theory is that command of the 1st passed over to Brigadier J. P. Zayas, who's Van was (in theory) subordinated to del Parque / Maj-Gen P. G. Zayas. If this variant is chosen Brigadier Zayas is assumed to command both 1st Division

and The Van as a four-brigade Division. The new division is wrecked when two of its brigades are wrecked. This variant does not cost any Victory Points.

5.7 Ney in command of IV Corps

About two months before the battle, Marshal Ney had been ordered to leave his command in Galicia and instead take command over IV Corps. Ney somehow avoided complying with this order and spent the summer quarreling with Soult instead. This variant assumes that he for good or bad did follow orders. Rule 4.5 is revoked reducing Sebastiani to commanding his own division and Ney appears whenever IV Corps HQ is called for. Ney functions as a normal Corps Commander except that if he rolls a "1" when rolling for delay reduction he will immediately throw away his order. There is no Victory Point cost for this variant.

6.0 Random Events

Use these together with the random events rules found in the Series Rules.

Die Result 1 Allied: Panic! French: Joseph Ponders

2 Allied: Craufurd Arrives French: Wilson? Venegas?

Allied: British Blunders
 French: Delay Reinforcement

4 Allied: PanicFrench: Victor Goes Crazy

5 Allied: Cuesta Rides Again French: Joseph Ponders

6 Allied: Heat French: Heat

Panic - Something, be it a stray goat or a French Division, spooks the Spanish troops. Create a rout as outlined in 5.1b disregarding if there is any French troops nearby or not. This event may only be rolled once and if it is called for on the 28th instead randomly determine a wrecked Spanish Division (if there is one) and roll one dice. If the roll is higher than the divisional commander's command rating the division must immediately carry out an emergency retreat.

Joseph Ponders - Joseph is either busy arguing with Victor or trying to make sense of the situation and may not issue any orders. This event will occur both if Joseph is on board or working 'via Remote' and

will last until the French Player manages to roll a five or six at the start of a French Command Phase.

Craufurd Arrives - Breaking every speed marching record there is, Craufurd's brigade arrives on the field at 01.19 provided this event was rolled on the 28th.

Wilson? Venegas? - News of Wilson or Venegas activities forces Joseph to detach units to guard his line of communications. The first time this result is rolled Joseph must order Desolles' Division to leave the map at 26.00 (should Dessoles not yet have entered he never does) and the second time it is rolled one of the cavalry divisions must be sent as well. A third roll has no result.

Delay Reinforcements - If the French player should have rolled for arrivals this turn, a this result means he may not roll at all and that this turn does not count for accumulating turns.

Heat - The Talavera Campaign was fought in oppressive heat. When this result is rolled during the day the sun takes its toll on things. One complete turn elapses without anything happening. Just move the turn-marker one step ahead.

British Blunders-One of the lower ranking British General Officers messes up. Rollone die. On a roll of 1-2 one of the (randomly determined) British cavalry brigades must if possible charge the nearest Frenchman or else suffer a loose cannon result. On a roll of 3-4 either Campbell or Mackenzie (roll die) suffers a loose cannon result. On a roll of 5-6 randomly determine one British brigade adjacent to a French unit. That brigade must immediately attack a French unit in close combat.

Victor Goes Crazy - If both Victor and Joseph are on board Victor will have a fit of sorts and throw away all orders involving his corps, regardless of order status. He will then move as fast as possible to Army HQ to discuss things further with the King of Spain.

Cuesta Rides Again – Cuesta briefly turns into an Iberian God of War. Roll one die. This is the number of Independent Orders Cuesta may immediately issue to his divisions, ignoring normal order costs and Cuesta's -4 on engage orders. After this fit of activity Cuesta will withdraw for a nap and will not do a thing for until the Allied player manages to roll a 6 on one die during the Command Phase.







7.0 Scenarios

7.1 General

All normal set up rules apply. Also note that:

- Units may deploy skirmishers unless explicitly forbidden to do so in the scenario rules.
- Losses suffered prior to a scenario are displayed as follows: Division or unit:

Casualties (Stragglers) <skirmisher steps>

Such as: Kemmis-4: 3 (9) <1>.

Losses suffered by a Division are distributed as the owning player sees fit.

• Roman numerals are used when referring to Spanish Divisions and Arabic ones when referring to British Divisions.

7.2 Campaign Starts

All the minor scenarios, except for the last one, might be used as starting points for a campaign-scenario. Simply add the information from the Campaign—part of the scenario and keep on playing until the 9:00 p.m., July 28 turn. The winner is then determined by the victory conditions in 6.3. In all these scenarios the French forces not yet on the map arrive as per the French reinforcement table.

7.3 Campaign Game Victory Conditions

To determine the winner the Victory Points (VP's) earned by each side are compared at the end of the game. VP's are earned for the following reasons.

7.3a Terrain.

- Casa de Salinas (50.04): 2VP
- The Crossroads (36.14): 1VP
- Talavera (all hexes inside of the wall): 3VP
- Cerro de Cascajal (27.25): 2VP
- Cerro de Medellín (all three of 18.25, 19.25 & 20.25): 5VP
- Casa de Valdefuentes (19.28): 1VP
- Pajar de Vergara (20.15): 3VP
- The "T-Junction" (8.20): 1VP
- The Oropesa Road (1.09): 2VP

Automatic Victory

If, at the start of any turn on the 28th, a player controls ALL Victory Point Hexes he wins an Automatic Victory.

7.3b Wrecked Formations.

Both sides receive victory points for wrecking enemy formations.

The Allied player receives 1 VP for each wrecked French Division and another VP per Division that is wrecked by hard casualties (as opposed to Stragglers) alone.

The French player receives 2 VP for each British division (including the cavalry division) wrecked by hard casualties alone and 1 VP for each Spanish Division wrecked by hard casualties alone.

If rule 2.6, "Cuesta Quits," is invoked the above changes slightly.

7.3c Victory.

Deduct the lower total from the higher.

If the difference is 6 or less, the game is a draw.

If the difference is between 7 and 11 points, the higher scoring player has won a tactical victory.

If the difference is 12 points or more, the higher scoring player has won a strategic victory.

The historical result was 10 or 11 points in the Allies favor.

1. Casa de Salinas - Short Scenario

3.00 p.m. July 27,1809

On the afternoon of the 27th Cuesta's army had streamed over the Alberche and Wellesley had started to withdraw his divisions to Talavera. As the Britishfell back from the Alberche, the troops of Mackenzie's Division around Casa de Salinas believed themselves to be protected by the river and were relaxing and waiting for new orders. Unknown to them Victor had found a ford a bit to the north, and under the cover of smoke from some burning buildings hit the flank of the relaxing British troops. The result was a chaotic running fight, but thanks to dumb luck more than anything else, Mackenzie's men got away.

General Information:

First Turn: 3.00 p.m., July 27 Last Turn: 6.00 p.m., July 27

Game Length: 7 turns

Play Area: All hexes east of hex row

31.xx.

First Player: French

French Information:

Set-up:

53.07: 16 Lt-2-I

Pre-Game losses:

None

Reinforcements:

3.00 p.m. 62.04: 2-1 less 16 Lt-2-1 and 2-I (2Lf)

3.30 p.m. 62.04: *Beamont-I*, I (2Lh), 2-I (2Lf)

4:30 p.m. 62.04: Rest of I Corps

Orders:

16 Lt-2-I has an (normally forbidden) Independent Order to attack Casa de Salinas.

2-I w. *Beamont-I* and I (2Lh) attached: Has an Independent Order to capture and then defend Casa de Salinas.

I Corps: Has orders to attack and capture Casa de Salinas and then attack up to the Vargas Road.

Special Rules:

The French may not deploy skirmishers at start.

The "up to the Vargas Road" part of I Corps orders are created by Victor's own initiative and therefore rule 4.1c is in effect if he wants to proceed west of Casa de Salinas.

The French player may only issue orders by using initiative.

Allied Information

Set-up

w/i 2 of 33.17: 1 Div less Langewerth-1,

Army HQ, 2x KGL (2Lf) 45.05: *Anson*-Cay, Payne

50.04: Wellesley

51.04: *Mackenzie-*3, facing Southeast or Southwest

51.05: Donkin-3, facing Southeast

Reinforcements:

3.30 p.m. With the 3 Divunit nearest (player's choice if tied) to 50.04: Mackenzie

Orders:

1 Div: Has a D5 delay on an order to move west and off the play area at 32.19.

3 Div: Has no orders.

Army HQ. Has no orders.

Cav (with only *Anson*-Cav): Has orders to protect the British retreat along the Talavera-Casa de Salinas road.

Pre-Game Losses:

None

Special Rules:

- Some British units start the scenario out of command. Out of command units may not move except with Wellesley's aid.
- Detached French brigade and divisions will automatically rejoin their parent units when within range.
- Mackenzie appears at the start of the Allied Command phase but may roll for initiative or be given orders the same turn.
- No British skirmishers may be deployed at start

Victory Conditions:

French Victory: French player manages to wreck three British brigades without any French brigade being wrecked.

British Victory: British player is able to move all his brigades off the playing area and none of them are wrecked.

Anything else is a draw.

1b. Casa de Salinas - Campaign Start

3.00 p.m. July 27, 1809

This additional information is needed to play the entire two-day battle scenario, starting with the first clash between Mackenzie and Lapisse's divisions.

General Information:

First Turn: 3.00 p.m., July 27 Last Turn: 9:00 p.m., July 28 Game Length: 53 turns Map Used: All First Player: French

French Information:

Set-up:

As per scenario 1.

Pre-Game losses:

None

Reinforcements:

As per scenario 1 plus the Table of Arrivals.

Orders:

As per scenario 1 and the Table of Arrivals.

Special Rules:

As per scenario 1 and the Game Rules.

Allied Information

Set-up:

w/i 2 of 10.12: II Cav (All) 12.11: Cuesta, Extremadura HQ w/i 1 of 13.20: Fane-Cav, Cotton-Cav w/i 1 of 14.14: V (All), Extrmdr (2Hf) w/i 1 of 15.02: I Cav (Less Rey-I Cav) w/i 1 of 15.06: I (All), Extrmdr (3Lf) w/i 1 of 15.08: Van (All), Extrmdr (2Lf) w/i 1 of 16.10: II (All) w/i 2 of 17.12: III (All) 19.12: Rey-IC w/i 2 of 19.17: 4 Div (All), British (2Lf) w/i 2 of 19.15: IV (All), Extrmdr (3Lf) w/i 1 of 23.21: 2 Div (All) 29.21: Langewerth-1, 2x British (2Lf) w/i 2 of 33.17: 1 Div less Langewerth-1, Army HQ, 2x KGL (2Lf) 45.05: Anson-Cav, Payne 50.04: Wellesley 51.04: Mackenzie-3, facing south 51.05: Donkin-3, facing southeast

Reinforcements:

As per scenario 1.

Orders:

1 Div: Has a D5 delay on an order to move west and defend the south slope of Cerro de Medellin (w/i 3 of 20.22).

2 Div: Has orders to move west and defend the summit of Cerro de Medellin (w/i 2 of 19.26).

4 Div has orders to defend the terrain north of the redoubt (w/i 2 of 19.17).

Cav (except *Fane-Cav* and *Cotton-Cav*): Has orders to protect the British retreat along the Talavera-Casa de Salinas road.

Rey-I Cav: Has an Independent Order to protect III and IV Divisions.

No other formations has any orders.

Pre-Game Losses:

Each Spanish Infantry Division: 0 (2) <0>

Special Rules:

As per scenario 1 and the Game Rules.

Victory Conditions:

As per 6.3

2. Ruffin's Attack - Short Scenario

9:00 p.m. July 27, 1809

Victor had been driving his troops hard. After fording the Alberche they had fallen on Wellesley's lounging troops around Casa de Salinas and given Donkin and Mackenzie a sharp check. As night fell, Victor, thinking he had Wellesley shaken and retreating, decided to launch a night attack to capture the important Cerro de Medellin. Ruffin commanded some very good troops, but the long day, rough terrain, and difficulty of co-ordinating a night attack, proved to be to much for them. After overrunning the first British line (troops that seem to have thought they were in a second line) the attack broke down and the French were chased down from the hill.

General Information:

First Turn: 9:00 p.m, July 27 Last Turn: 1:00 a.m, July 28 Game Length: 5 turns

Map Used: Only hexrows north of xx.18 inclusive are in play. No unit may move

south of this area. First Player: French

French Information:

Set-up:

24.25: 24 Ln-1-I 24.24: 9 Lt-1-1, 1-I (2Lf), Ruffin 24.23: 96 Ln-1-I 24.20, 24.21, 24.22: 2-I (All) 27.25: *Beamont-I*, I (2Lh) w/i 1 27.24: 3-I (All) 27.24: Victor, I Corps HQ I (2Lh) and I (3Hf) may stack with any unit of I Corps.

Reinforcements:

None

Orders

1-I: Has an Independent Order to attack and then hold the high ground of Cerro de Medellin (18.25, 19.25 & 20.25).

The rest of I Corps has no orders.

Pre-Game Losses:

2-I: 1 (2) <1>

Special Rules:

On the 9:00 p.m turn each of Ruffin's brigades must roll 1 die. On a roll of 4-6 the movement allowance for that unit and its skirmishers is halved for that turn only.

- Note that while 1-1's o ders are from Victor's own initiative rule 4.1c is not in effect as 1-I are on an independent order.
- The French player may only issue orders by using initiative and may not roll at all for it on the 9:00 p.m. turn.

Allied Information:

Set-up:

17.26: Tilson-2, ex-18.25

18.23: Donkin-3

20.24: Löwe-1, ex-20.25

20.22: Langewerth-1, KGL (2Lf)

21.21: *Cameron*-1, ex-21.20, British

(2Lf)

17.23: Stewart-2

13.20: *Fane-Cav*

13.21: Anson-Cav

16.23 KGL (2Lf) limbered

19.21 British (2Lf)

18.25 Army HQ

20.18: Campbell-1, ex-20.19

Reinforcements:

9:00pm 15.20 Hill. (Enters with only half (7) of his movement points available.) 11:00pm 17.20 Wellesley, *Kemmis*-4

Orders:

Both 1 and 2 have orders to defend their current positions.

Pre-Game Losses:

3 Division: 1 (2) <1>

Special Rules:

- No British skirmishers may set-up at start.
- No British infantry unit may move, fire or release skirmishers until a French unit has fired. (Rolling on the Odds Table is considered "firing.") This limitation is lifted at the start of the 11.00 pm turn.
- Note that all British units start the scenario out of command and that most of them will stay so for the whole scenario. Out of command units may not move except with Wellesley's aid.

Note that Sherbroke does not enter the scenario at all.

Victory Conditions:

The player who holds at least two of the high ground of Cerro de Medellin (18.25, 20.25, 19.25) at the end of the scenario is the winner.

2b. Ruffin's Attack – Campaign Start 9:00 p.m. July 27, 1809

This additional information is needed to play the campaign scenario, starting with Ruffin's night attack.

General Information:

First Turn: 9:00 p.m., July 27 Last Turn: 9:00 p.m., July 28 Game Length: 42 turns

Map Used: All First Player: French

French Information:

Set-up:

As per scenario 2 plus: w/i 1 of 30.20: 1DR (All) w/i 1 of 22.02: 2DR, DR (2Lh)

w/i 2 of 36.10: 1-IV (All), IV Corps HQ,

Sebastiani

w/i 2 of 38.08: 3-IV (All) w/i 2 of 40.05: 2-IV (All)

Reinforcements:

As per the Table of Arrivals. Cav-IV has not arrived yet.

Orders:

1-I: Has an Independent Order to attack and then hold the high ground of Cerro de Medellin (18.25, 19.25 & 20.25).

IV: Has orders to defend along the line between 24.12 and 24.20 facing west.

2DR: Has an Independent Order to defend on the Madrid Road.

No other French formation has any orders.

Pre-Game Losses:

2-I: 1 (2) <1>

Special Rules:

On the 9:00 p.m turn each of Ruffin's brigades must roll 1 die. On a roll of 4-6 the movement allowance for that unit and its skirmishers is halved for that turn only.

• Note that while 1-I's orders are from Victor's own initiative rule 4.1c is not in effect as 1-I are on independent orders.

• The French player may not roll for initiative on the 9:00 p.m. turn.

Allied Information

Set-up:

w/i 2 of 10.12: II Cav (All)

17.16: Cuesta, Extremadura HQ

w/i 1 of 14.14: V (All), Extrmdr (2Hf)

w/i 1 of 15.02: I Cav (Less Rey-IC)

w/i 1 of 15.02: I cav (Eess Rey 12) w/i 1 of 15.06: I (All), Extrmdr (3Lf)

w/i 1 of 15.06. I (All), Extrindi (3Ll) w/i 1 of 15.08: Van (All), Extrindi (2Lf)

w/1 1 01 15.06. van (An), Exum

w/i 1 of 16.10: II (All)

w/i 2 of 17.12: III (All)

19.12: Rey-I Cav

w/i 1 of 19.14: IV (All), Extrmdr (3Lf)

17.26: Tilson-2, ex-18.25

18.23: Donkin-3

20.24: *Löwe*-1, ex-20.25

20.22: Langewerth-1, KGL (2Lf)

21.21: Cameron-1, Sherbrooke, ex-21.20,

British (2Lf)

17.23: Stewart-2, Hill

13.20: *Fane-Cav*

13.21: Anson-Cav

16.23 KGL (2Lf) limbered

19.21 British (2Lf)

18.25 Army HQ

20.18: Campbell-1, ex-20.19

16.21: Mackenzie-3, Mackenzie

11.07: Wellesley

15.18: Cotton-Cav, Payne

18.13: Kemmis-4

20.16: Cambpell-4, Campbell, ex-20.17

20.15: British (2Lf)

Reinforcements:

None

Orders:

All infantry divisions save for V and 3 have orders to defend their current positions. So has I Cav. V Division has orders to await orders. *Rey*-I Cav has an Independent Order to support the Allied Troops around Pajar de Vergara

Pre-Game Losses:

3 Division: 2 (2) <1>
Fernando VII-IV: 0 (3) <0>
Osuna-II: 0 (2) <0>

Special Rules:

- No British skirmishers may Set-up at start.
- No British infantry unit may move, fire or release skirmishers until a French unit has fired or entered close combat. This limitation is lifted at the start of the 11.00 pm turn.
- The "Off to Dinner" rule is in effect.

Victory Conditions:

As per 6.3.

3. The Dawn Attack - Short Scenario

5:00 am July 28, 1809

As the sun came up Victor, who did not feel like waiting for the rest of the French Army to arrive, decided to launch a second attack to capture Cerro de Medellin. By courier Joseph half-heartedly agreed to the plan and sent out orders for Sebastiani to support the attack. But as Victor's first division was repulsed, the rest of the attacking formations got cautious and eventually the attack ground to a halt.

General Information:

First Turn: 5:00 am, July 28 Last Turn: 9:00 am, July 28 Game Length: 9 turns

Map Used: Only hexrows north of xx.18 inclusive are in play. No unit may move

south of this area. First Player: French

French Information:

Set-up:

w/i 1 of 23.27: 1-I (All) w/i 1 of 25.23: 3-I (All), I (3Hf) 25.25: Victor, I Corps HQ w/i 1 of 25.19: 1-IV (All), IV Corps HQ,

Sebastiani

w/i 1 of 24.21: 2-I (All), I (2Lh) w/i 1 of 30.20: 1DR (All) 27.25: Beamont-I, I (2Lh)

Reinforcements:

8:00 am 32.18: Dessolles (All), RG (All), Army (2Lh), Army (2Lf), Joseph, Jourdan, Army HQ.

Orders:

1-I: Has an Independent Order to attack and hold the high ground of Cerro de Medellin (18.25, 19.25 & 20.25).

2-I and 3-I: Each has an Independent Order to attack Cerro de Medellin's south slope, north of the orchards, as soon as 1-I gains any high ground hex-of the Cerro de Medellin.

I-IV: Has a D6 an Independent Order to Attack the British among the orchards to its front the turn after 2-I and 3-I crosses the Portina brook.

All Reinforcements arriving at 8:00 have orders to move to w/i 3 of I Corps' HQ.

Pre Scenario Losses:

1-I: 4(2) < 2 >2-I: 1 (1) <1>

Special Rules:

- The French player may only issue orders by using initiative before Joseph enters the game. Joseph may not issue orders "by remote" in this scenario.
- Note that while 1 Corp's orders are from Victor's own initiative rule 4.1c is not in effect as all divisions are on Independent Orders.
- Each infantry unit of I Corps may initially only deploy its skirmishers in any hex adjacent to itself.

Allied Information:

Set-up:

13.20: Fane-Cav, Payne 13.21: Anson-Cav 18.25: Wellesley, Army HQ 20.21: Cameron-1, ex-20.20

19.21: British (2Lf) 18.21: Donkin-3

20.22: Langewerth-1, British (2Lf),

Sherbroke 20.23: Löwe-1

19.24: Tilson-2, ex-19.25, Hill 19.26: Stewart-2, ex-19.27

20.25: KGL (2Lf) 20.24: KGL (2Lf)

Reinforcements:

None

Orders:

Both 2 and 1 have orders to defend their current positions.

Pre-Game Losses:

1 Division: 2 (2) <1> 2 Division: 1 (1) <0> 3 Division: 1 (0) <1>

Special Rules:

Note that Donkin-3 starts the scenario out of command and will stay so for the whole scenario. The brigade may not move except with Wellesley's aid.

Infantry units may initially deploy their skirmishers in any hex adjacent to themselves.

Victory Conditions:

The player who holds at least two of the high ground of Cerro de Medellin (18.25, 20.25, 19.25) and has wrecked more enemy brigades than himself has brigades wrecked at the end of the scenario is the winner.

3b. The Dawn Attack - Campaign Start 5:00 am July 28, 1809

This additional information is needed to play the battle scenario, starting at dawn of the 28th.

General Information:

First Turn: 5:00 a.m., July 28 Last Turn: 9:00 p.m., July 28 Game Length: 33 turns Map Used: All First Player: French

French Information:

Set-up:

As per scenario 3 plus: w/i 2 of 23.07: 2DR, DR (2Lh) w/i 1 of 25.15: Cav-IV (All) 25.15: 2-IV (All) w/i 1 of 24.15 and not in hexrow 23.00: 3-IV (All)

Reinforcements:

As per the Table of Arrivals.

Orders:

As per scenario 3.

IV (Less I-IV): Has orders to defend along the line between 24.12 and 24.20 facing

2DR: Has an Independent Order to defend on the Madrid Road.

All Reinforcements arriving at 8:00 have orders to move to w/i 3 of I Corps HQ.

Pre Scenario Losses:

As per scenario 3.

Special Rules:

As per scenario 3, but Joseph may issue by remote orders.

Allied Information

Set-up:

w/i 2 of 10.12: II Cav (All) 17.16: Cuesta, Extremadura HQ w/i 1 of 14.14: V (All), Extrmdr (2Hf) w/i 1 of 15.02: I Cav (Less Rey-I Cav) w/i 1 of 15.06: I (All), Extrmdr (3Lf) w/i 1 of 15.08: Van (All), Extrmdr (2Lf) w/i 1 of 16.10: II (All) w/i 2 of 17.12: III (All) 19.12: Rev-I Cav w/i 1 of 19.14: IV (All), Extrmdr (3Lf)

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - Army of Extremadura

Unit ID	Skirmishers	Morale	Fire levels
Van Div - J.P. Za Brbsto-Van	yas	□ ∕ □	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: Borrowed:
Cmpmyr-Van		D Levy	A B B C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
I Div - del Parque Grndrs-I Cntbra-I	/ P.G Zayas	C D Levy	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: A B C B C C C
II Div - Iglesias Extra-II Osna-II		D Levy	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: AB AB A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
III Div - de Porta Tldo-III	ngo	□ ∕ □ D	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: AB AB A A B C AB B C B B C B B C B B C B B C B B C B B C B B C B B C B B C
Bdjoz-III		D	AB A A B C
IV Div - Manglar Jaen-IV	10	□ / □	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: AB AB B C B
Frndo VII-IV		E Levy	AB
V Div Bassecourt Marina-V	t	□√□ B	No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ ☐ ✔ C ☐ ☐
Africa-V		C	AA
I-Cav Div - Hene Rey-I Cav Lusitna-I Cav	estrosa	□√□ B D	No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed: ☐ B ☐ ☐ C ✓ ☐ ☐ ☐ A ☐ B ☐ ✓ ☐ C ☐ ☐ ☐
II-Cav Div - Albu Extrmd-II Cav	ıquerque		No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed:☐ B☐✓☐ C ☐☐☐
Infante-II Cav		C	$B \square C \square \checkmark \square \square$
Pavia-II Cav		D	A D B C C
Optional Van + I Div - J.P	Zayas		☐ No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed: ☐

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - King Joseph's Army

			• •
Unit ID Skirmishers		Morale	Fire levels
I Corps Bumnt-Cv-I 1-I Div - Ruffin □□✓□		В	A B _ / C
9Lt-1-I LaBruyere 24Ln-1-I LaBruyere 96Ln-1-1 Barrois 2-I Div - Lapisse		A B B	A
16Lt-2-I La Plannes 45Ln-2-I La Plannes 8Ln-2-I Solignac 54Ln-2-I Solignac		A C B	AB
3-I Div - Villatte 27Lt-3-I Cassagne 63Ln-3-I Cassagne 94Ln-3-I Puthod 95Ln-3-I Puthod		B B C	A
IV Corps		C	
1-IV Div - Sébastiani 28Ln-1-IV Rey 32Ln-1-IV Rey 58Ln-1-IV Liger-Belair 75Ln-1-IV Liger-Belair		B B B	AB
2-IV Div - Valence 4Pol-2-IV		A	A
3-IV Div - Leval □□✓□ vPrbk-3-IV Schfr-3-IV Holl-3-IV Chasse		B B C	AB
Cv-IV Div - Merlin		B B	A
1 DR Div - Latour-Maubourg Rosseau-1DR Oldburg-1DR Digeon-1DR	g 🔲 🗸	B C C	AB
2 DR Div - Milhaud Boye-2DR Muptit-2DR		B C	AB
RG (Royal Guard) - Joseph Gren-RG Saligny Cv-RG Saligny		D D	A
Ds Div - Desolles 12Lt-Ds Godinot 51Ln-Ds Godinot 27Ch-Ds		B B B	AB

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - Army of Portugal

Unit ID	Skirmisher	s Morale	Fire levels
1 Div - Sherbro	oke		
Campbell-1		A	AB
Cameron-1		В	A□□ B□□✓□ C□□□
vLngwrth-1	\bigcirc	В	A C C C
vLöwe-1		В	A D B C C
2 Div - Hill			
Tilson-2		В	AB
Stewart-2		В	AB □ A □□□□□ ∕ B □□□ C □□□
3 Div - Mackenz	zie		
Mackenzie-3		В	AB □□□□ A □□□□✓□ B □□□□ C □□□
Donkin-3	\bigcirc	C	A B C
4 Div - Campbe	11		
Campbell-4		В	A 🔲 B 🔲 🗬 🗸 C 🔲 🗬
Kemmis-4		В	AB A B C
Cav - Payne			
Fane-Cav		A	AB □ A □□□□ B □□✓□ C □□□
Cotton-Cav		В	A COO B VOO COO
Anson-Cav		C	A □ □ B □ ✓ □ □ C □ □ □
Optional Crufd-Light	00	A	AB □ □ A □ □ □ □ B □ ✔ □ □ C □ □ □
	O = A Mon	rale Skirmisher	

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - Army of Extremadura

Unit ID	Skirmishers	Morale	Fire levels
Van Div - J.P. Zay Brbsto-Van Cmpmyr-Van	vas	C D Levy	No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ ☐ ✓ C ☐ ☐ A ☐ ☐ ☐ ✓ B ☐ ☐ C ☐ ☐
I Div - del Parquel Grndrs-I Cntbra-I	P.G Zayas	C D Levy	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: A BORROWED C A BORROWED C BORR
II Div - Iglesias Extra-II Osna-II		D Levy	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: AB AB A A A A A B B A A A A A A A A A
III Div - de Porta Tldo-III Bdjoz-III	go	D D	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: AB A A B C B C C AB C C B B C C B C C B C C B C C C C
IV Div - Manglan Jaen-IV Frndo VII-IV	o	C E Levy	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: AB AB A A A A B A B A A B A B A B A B
V Div Bassecourt Marina-V Africa-V		□ ✓ □ B C	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: A B B A B A B B B B B B B B B B B B B
I-Cav Div - Henes Rey-I Cav Lusitna-I Cav	strosa	B D	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: BORROWED ADBORROWED BORROWED
II-Cav Div - Albu Extrmd-II Cav	querque	E	No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed: ☐ B☐ ✓ ☐ C ☐ ☐ ☐
Infante-II Cav Pavia-II Cav		C D	
Optional Van + I Div - J.P.	Zayas		☐ No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed: ☐

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - King Joseph's Army

Unit ID Skirmishers	3	Morale	Fire levels
I Corps Bumnt-Cv-I 1-I Div - Ruffin □□✓□		В	A B / C
9Lt-1-I <i>LaBruyere</i> 24Ln-1-I <i>LaBruyere</i> 96Ln-1-1 <i>Barrois</i>		A B B	A
16Lt-2-I <i>La Plannes</i> 45Ln-2-I <i>La Plannes</i> 8Ln-2-I <i>Solignac</i> 54Ln-2-I <i>Solignac</i>		A C B	AB
3-I Div - Villatte 27Lt-3-I Cassagne 63Ln-3-I Cassagne 94Ln-3-I Puthod 95Ln-3-I Puthod		B B B	A
IV Corps	_	C	
1-IV Div - Sébastiani 28Ln-1-IV Rey 32Ln-1-IV Rey 58Ln-1-IV Liger-Belair 75Ln-1-IV Liger-Belair		B B B	AB
2-IV Div - Valence 4Pol-2-IV	□ ✓	A	A B / _ C
3-IV Div - Leval □□✓□ vPrbk-3-IV Schfr-3-IV Holl-3-IV Chasse		B B C	AB
Cv-IV Div - Merlin Strolz-IV Merlin-IV		B B	A
1 DR Div - Latour-Maubourg	g 🔲 🗸	_	
Rosseau-1DR Oldburg-1DR Digeon-1DR		B C C	AB
2 DR Div - Milhaud Boye-2DR Muptit-2DR		B C	AB
RG (Royal Guard) - Joseph Gren-RG Saligny Cv-RG Saligny		D D	A
Ds Div - Desolles 12Lt-Ds Godinot 51Ln-Ds Godinot 27Ch-Ds		B B B	AB

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - Army of Portugal

Unit ID	Skirmisher.	s Morale	Fire levels
1 Div - Sherbroo	ke		
Campbell-1		A	AB
Cameron-1		В	$A \square \square B \square \square \checkmark \square C \square \square \square$
vLngwrth-1	\bigcirc	В	A O C O
vLöwe-1		В	A D B C C D
2 Div - Hill			
Tilson-2		В	AB
Stewart-2		В	AB A COCC
3 Div - Mackenz	ie		
Mackenzie-3		В	AB □□□□ A □□□□✓□ B □□□□ C □□□□
Donkin-3	\bigcirc	C	A
4 Div - Campbel	l		
Campbell-4		В	A D B C C C
Kemmis-4		В	AB □ A □ □ □ ✓ B □ □ C □ □ □
Cav - Payne			
Fane-Cav		A	AB A A B B C C
Cotton-Cav		В	A OOO BOYOU COOO
Anson-Cav		C	A □ □ B □ ✔ □ □ C □ □ □
Optional Crufd-Light		A	AB
	O = A Mor	ale Skirmisher	

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - Army of Extremadura

			-
Unit ID Si	kirmishers	Morale	Fire levels
Van Div - J.P. Zayas	S		No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed:
Brbsto-Van)	C	A D B DDD C DDD
Cmpmyr-Van)	D Levy	A □□□□□ ✓ B □□□ C □□□
I Div - del Parque / P	2.G Zayas		No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed:
Grndrs-I		C	A
Cntbra-I		D Levy	A DDD B DDD C DDD
II Div - Iglesias			No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed:
Extra-II		D	AB
Osna-II		D Levy	AB
III Div - de Portago			No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed:
Tldo-III		D	AB
Bdjoz-III		D	AB A A B C B
IV Div - Manglano			No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed:
Jaen-IV		C	AB □□□ A □□□□✓□ B □□□ C □□□
Frndo VII-IV		E Levy	AB A A B C C
V Div Bassecourt			No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed:
Marina-V		В	$A \square \square B \square \square \square \checkmark C \square \square \square$
Africa-V		C	AA AB A
I-Cav Div - Henestr	osa		No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed:
Rey-I Cav		В	B □□□ C ✓ □□□
Lusitna-I Cav		D	A □ B □✔□□ C □□□
II-Cav Div - Albuqu	ierque		No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed:
Extrmd-II Cav		E	B C C
Infante-II Cav		C	$B \square C \square \checkmark \square \square$
Pavia-II Cav		D	A □ B □✔□□ C □□□
Optional Van + I Div - J.P Za	ıyas		☐ No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed: ☐

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - King Joseph's Army

Unit ID Skirmishers		Morale	Fire levels
I Corps		n	
Bumnt-Cv-I 1-I Div - Ruffin □□✓□		В	A OOO BOYOU COO
9Lt-1-I <i>LaBruyere</i>		A	A B C
24Ln-1-I <i>LaBruyere</i> 96Ln-1-1 <i>Barrois</i>		B B	A
2-I Div - Lapisse □□□✓□]	Ь	AB □ A □□□□□✓ B □□□ C □□□
16Lt-2-I La Plannes		A	AB A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
45Ln-2-I <i>La Plannes</i> 8Ln-2-I <i>Solignac</i>		C B	
54Ln-2-I Solignac		В	AB A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
3-I Div - Villatte]	В	
27Lt-3-I Cassagne 63Ln-3-I Cassagne		В	
94Ln-3-I Puthod		В	A B _ / _ C
95Ln-3-I Puthod		C	A OOO B OVO C OOO
IV Corps			
1-IV Div - Sébastiani 28Ln-1-IV Rey		В	AB □□□ A □□□□✓□ B □□□ C □□□
32Ln-1-IV Rey		В	AB
58Ln-1-IV <i>Liger-Belair</i> 75Ln-1-IV <i>Liger-Belair</i>		B B	AB □ A □ □ □ □ ✓ B □ □ □ C □ □ □ □ AB □ □ A □ □ □ □ □ ✓ B □ □ □ C □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
2-IV Div - Valence		D	
4Pol-2-IV 3-IV Div - Leval □□✓□		A	A
vPrbk-3-IV		В	AB □ A □ □ □ □ ✓ B □ □ □ C □ □ □
Schfr-3-IV		В	AB A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Holl-3-IV <i>Chasse</i> Cv-IV Div - Merlin □✓□		C	A D B D C D
Strolz-IV		В	A □ B □□□ ✓ C □□□
Merlin-IV		В	B C C
1 DR Div - Latour-Maubourg			
Rosseau-1DR Oldburg-1DR		B C	AB A A A B A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Digeon-1DR		$\ddot{\mathbf{c}}$	AB
2 DR Div - Milhaud □□✓	_		
Boye-2DR	_	В	AB
Muptit-2DR		\mathbf{C}	AB A A A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B
RG (Royal Guard) - Joseph			
Gren-RG Saligny		D	A OOO B OO C OO
Cv-RG Saligny		D	C 🗆 🗸 🔲 🗆
Ds Div - Desolles		-	
12Lt-Ds Godinot 51Ln-Ds Godinot		B B	AB
27Ch-Ds		В	

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - Army of Portugal

Unit ID	Skirmisher	rs Morale	Fire levels
1 Div - Sherbro	ooke		
Campbell-1		A	AB
Cameron-1		В	A□□ B□□✓□ C□□□
vLngwrth-1	\bigcirc	В	A
vLöwe-1		В	A □ B □ □ ✓ □ C □ □ □
2 Div - Hill			
Tilson-2		В	AB □□ A □□□□□ ∕ B □□□ C □□□
Stewart-2		В	AB □ A □ □ □ □ C □ □ □
3 Div - Macker	ızie		
Mackenzie-3		В	AB □□□□ A □□□□✓□ B □□□□ C □□□□
Donkin-3	\bigcirc	C	A D B V C D
4 Div - Campb	ell		
Campbell-4		В	A □ B □□□✓ C □□□
Kemmis-4		В	AB
Cav - Payne			
Fane-Cav		A	AB □ A □□□□ B □□✔□ C □□□
Cotton-Cav		В	A B / C
Anson-Cav		C	A□□□ B □✔□□ C □□□
Optional Crufd-Light	00	A	AB □ A □ □ □ □ B □ ✔ □ □ C □ □ □
	O = A Mo	rale Skirmisher	

O = A Morale Skirmisher

NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - Army of Extremadura

Unit ID	Skirmishers	Morale	Fire levels
Van Div - J.P. Zaya Brbsto-Van Cmpmyr-Van	as	C D Levy	No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ ☐ ✓ C ☐ ☐ ☐ A ☐ ☐ ☐ ✓ B ☐ ☐ C ☐ ☐ ☐
I Div - del Parque/ Grndrs-I Cntbra-I	P.G Zayas	C D Levy	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: A BORROWED C A BORROWED B C DD
II Div - Iglesias Extra-II Osna-II		D Levy	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: AB AB A A A A B A B A A A A B A B A A A A A A A A A A B A
III Div - de Portag Tldo-III Bdjoz-III	ο	D D	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: AB A B C C C C C
IV Div - Mangland Jaen-IV Frndo VII-IV	•	C E Levy	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: AB AB A A A B C AB C C AB C C C B C C C C
V Div Bassecourt Marina-V Africa-V		□✓□ B C	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: A B B B C C C A A A B B C C C C B B C C C C
I-Cav Div - Henest Rey-I Cav Lusitna-I Cav	trosa	D D	No more Wellesley orders: Borrowed: ABBCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
II-Cav Div - Albuq Extrmd-II Cav Infante-II Cav	Juerque	E C	No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed:☐ B☐✓☐ C ☐✓☐☐ B ☐ C ☐✓☐☐
Pavia-II Cav		D	A B C C
Optional Van + I Div - J.P Z	ayas		☐ No more Wellesley orders: ☐ Borrowed: ☐

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - King Joseph's Army

Unit ID	Skirmishers	Morale	Fire levels
I Corps Bumnt-Cv-I 1-I Div - Ruffin		В	A DD B VD C
9Lt-1-I <i>LaBruy</i> 24Ln-1-I <i>LaBr</i> 96Ln-1-1 <i>Barro</i>	vere	A B B	A
2-I Div - Lapiss 16Lt-2-I La Pla 45Ln-2-I La Pla 8Ln-2-I Solign 54Ln-2-I Solign 3-I Div - Villatte	nnes	A C B	AB
27Lt-3-I Cassa 63Ln-3-I Cassa 94Ln-3-I Putho 95Ln-3-I Putho	gne 🔲 gne d	B B B C	A
IV Corps 1-IV Div - Sébas	stiani 🗆 🗆 🗸 🗆		
28Ln-1-IV Rey 32Ln-1-IV Rey 58Ln-1-IV Lige 75Ln-1-IV Lige	er-Belair	B B B	AB
2-IV Div - Valer 4Pol-2-IV		A	A B C
vPrbk-3-IV Schfr-3-IV Holl-3-IV Chas		B B C	AB
Cv-IV Div - Me Strolz-IV Merlin-IV	rlin 🔲 🗸 🔲	B B	A
1 DR Div - Lato	ur-Maubourg 🔲 🗀 ,		
Rosseau-1DR Oldburg-1DR Digeon-1DR		B C C	AB
2 DR Div - Milh Boye-2DR Muptit-2DR	aud 🔲 🗸 🗌	B C	AB
RG (Royal Gua Gren-RG Salign Cv-RG Saligny		D D	A B C C
Ds Div - Desolle 12Lt-Ds <i>Godin</i> 51Ln-Ds <i>Godin</i> 27Ch-Ds	ot \Box	B B B	AB

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NBS # 6-04 Talavera Loss Chart - Army of Portugal

Unit ID	Skirmisher	s Morale	Fire levels
1 Div - Sherbrooke			
Campbell-1		A	AB
Cameron-1		В	A□□ B□□✓□ C□□□
vLngwrth-1	\bigcirc	В	A D B C C C
vLöwe-1		В	A D B C C
2 Div - Hill			
Tilson-2		В	AB □□ A □□□□✓ B □□□ C □□□
Stewart-2		В	AB A A COC
3 Div - Mackenzie			
Mackenzie-3		В	AB □□□□ A □□□□✓□ B □□□□ C □□□□
Donkin-3	\bigcirc	C	A DD B VD C
4 Div - Campbell			
Campbell-4		В	A D B C C
Kemmis-4		В	AB
Cav - Payne			
Fane-Cav		A	AB □ A □□□□ B □□✔□ C □□□
Cotton-Cav		В	A DO B ZO C
Anson-Cav		C	A D B V C D C
Optional Crufd-Light	00	A	AB
	O = A Morale Skirmisher		

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13.20: Fane-Cav, Payne

13.21: Anson-Cav

18.25: Wellesley, Army HQ

20.21: Cameron-1, ex-20.20

19.21: British (2Lf)

18.21: Donkin-3

20.22: Langewerth-1, British (2Lf),

Sherbroke

20.23: Löwe-1

19.24: Tilson-2, ex-19.25, Hill

19.26: Stewart-2, ex-19.27

20.25: KGL (2Lf)

20.24: KGL (2Lf)

20.18: Campbell-1, ex-20.19

16.21: Mackenzie-3, Mackenzie

15.18: Cotton-Cav, Payne

18.13: Kemmis-4

20.16: Cambpell-4, Campbell, ex-20.17

20.15: British (2Lf)

Reinforcements:

None

Orders:

All infantry divisions save for V and 3 have orders to defend their current positions. So has I Cav. V Division has orders to await orders. *Rey*-I Cav has an Independent Order to support the Allied Troops around Pajar de Vergara

Pre-Game Losses:

1 Division: 2 (2) <1>
2 Division: 1 (1) <0>
3 Division: 2 (0) <1>
Fernando VII-IV: 0 (2) <0>
Osuna-II: 0 (1) <0>

Special Rules:

As per scenario 3.

Victory Conditions:

As per 6.3

4. The Main Assault

2.30 p.m., July 28, 1809

As Joseph came up a long debate broke out among the French commanders and it took until mid-afternoon before they came around to launching their third and final attack on the Allied position. Victor's men were too weary to do any serious attacking, but kept Wellesley's northern flank pinned, and meanwhile Sebastiani's men hurled themselves at the Allied line. After some very brutal fighting that wrecked both Sebastiani's Corps and most of the Allied center, the French withdrew, leaving the Allies still holding their positions. Despite the pleas from Victor and others who believed that a final attack would break the enemy line, Joseph refused. The battle was over.

General Information:

First Turn: 2:30 p.m., July 28 Last Turn: 6:00 p.m., July 28 Game Length: 8 turns Map Used: All First Player: French

French Information:

Set-up:

w/i 2 of 36.18: Dessolles (All), Army (2Lh)

35.25: Jourdan and Joseph, Army HQ,

RG (All)

w/i 1 of 30.20: 1DR (All),

w/i 1 of 29.24: Beamont-1, I (2Lh)

25.25: Victor, I Corps HQ

w/i 1 of 26.28: Cav-IV (All)

25.22: 54 Ln-2-I

25.23: 45 Ln-2-I

25.15: 2-IV (All)

24.20: 32 Ln-1-IV, Army (2Lf)

24.19: 58 Ln-1-IV, Sebastiani

w/i 1 of 25.19: IV Corps HQ

24.18: 75 Ln-1-IV, I (2Lh)

w/i 1 of 24.15 and not in hexrow 23.00: 3-IV (All)

w/i 1 of 23.31: 1-I (All)

23.28: 63 Ln-3-I

23.27: 27 Lt-3-I

23.24: 3-I (less 63 Ln-3-I and 27 Lt-3-I)

23.23: 16 Lt-2-I, I (3Hf), Lapisse

23.22: 8 Ln-2-I, 2-1 (2Lf)

23.17: 28 Ln-1-IV, 1-IV (2Lf)

w/i 2 of 23.07: 2DR, DR (2Lh)

Pre scenarios losses:

1-I: 7 (4) <4>

2-I: 1 (1) <2>

Reinforcements:

None

Orders:

2-I: Has an Independent Order to attack the British between crest of the Cerro de Medellin and the edge of the Orchards south of it

1-I with 63 Ln-3-I and 27 Lt-3-I attached: Has an Independent Order to attack the British on the north-east slope of the Cerro de Medellin, south of Casa de Valdefuentes.

1-IV: Has an Independent Order to attack the British line in the Orchards south of the Cerro de Medellin

3-IV: Has an Independent Order to attack the Allied line around Pajar de Vergara. 2DR: Has an Independent Order to defend on the Madrid Road.

Special Rules:

- The reinforced 1-I breaks when three of its brigades have been wrecked. The reduced 3-I breaks after both its brigades has been wrecked.
- Each regiment of I and IV Corps may deploy its skirmishers in any hex-adjacent to itself.

Allied Information

Set-up:

17.16: Cuesta, Extremadura HQ

w/i 2 of 12.27: II Cav (All)

13.27: Fane-Cav

14.27: Anson-Cav

15.02: Lustna-I Cav, Henestrosa

15.05: Cntbra-I, Extrmdr (3Lf)

15.06: Grndrs-I, Zayas II/del Parque

15.07: Cmpmyr-Van

15.08: Extrmdr (2Lf)

15.09: Brbsto-Van, Zayas I

15.10: Extra-II

16.31: Marina-V, ex-16.32, Bassecourt

15.31: *Africa*-V, ex-15.30

16.10: Osna- II, Iglesias, ex-17.11

16.18: Mackenzie-3, Mackenzie

16.22: Donkin-3

17.11: *Bdjoz*-III

17.25: KGL (1Lf) (detached)

17.12: *Tldo*-III, de Portago, ex 18.12,

Extrmdr 1Lf (Detached)

19.12: Rey-I Cav

18.16: Kemmis-4

18.21: Cotton-Cav, Payne

18.26: Stewart-2, ex-18.25

18.25: Wellesley, Army HQ

19.13: *Frndo* VII-IV, Extrmdr (3Lf) with one point detached

19.14: Jaen-IV, Manglano, ex-19.15

19.17: Extrmdr (2Hf)

19.24: Tilson-2, Rpl Leader (Tilson,

replacing Hill), ex-19.25

20.15: British (2Lf), One Spanish

Skirmisher from Van-Division.

20.16: Campbell-4, ex-20.17, Campbell

20.18: Campbell-1, KGL (2Lf) with one pt destroyed, ex-20.19

20.21: *Cameron*-1, ex-20.20, British (2Lf), Sherbrooke

20.22: Langewerth-1, British (2Lf)

20.23: Lowe-1

20.25: KGL (2Lf) with one pt detached

Pre-Game Losses:

1 Division: 2 (4) <2>

2 Division: 3 (1) <1>

3 Division: 2 (0) <1>

Fernando VII-IV: 0 (2) <0> Osuna-II: 0 (1) <0>

Hill is wounded, Tilson (the replacement side of Hill's counter) is in command of 2nd

One pt of KGL Artillery is destroyed.

Reinforcements:

None

Orders:

All infantry divisions save for 3 have orders to defend their current positions. So has I Cav.

Fane-Cav and Anson-Cav each has an Independent Order to defend the British left around Casa de Valdefuentes.

II-Cv has an Independent Order to support V Div.

Rey-I Cav has an Independent Order to support the Allied Troops around Pajar de Vergara.

Special Rules:

Each infantry unit so capable may deploy its skirmishers in any hex adjacent to itself, but note that one of the Van's skirmishers are already deployed in Pajar de Vergara. V Div and II Cav (as well as (2Hf)) are loaned to Wellesley.

Victory Conditions:

Decisive Victory: Occupies at least two hexes of the high ground of Cerro de Medellin (18.25, 20.25, 19.25) and has less wrecked brigades than opponent

Marginal Victory: Occupies at least two hexes of the high ground of Cerro de Medellin (18.25, 20.25, 19.25) but has more wrecked brigades than opponent

Draw: All other cases

Order of Battle

The Army of Portugal

(His Britannic Majesty's forces in Portugal) Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Wellesley

1st Division

Lt-Gen. John Cope Sherbrooke Brigadier General Henry Fred Campbell's Brigade 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards

1st Battalion, 3rd Foot Guards

One co. 5/60th (Royal American) Foot Brig. Gen. Alan Cameron's Brigade

1/61st (South Gloucestershire) Foot 2/83rd Foot

One co. 5/60th (Royal American) Foot Brig. Gen. Ernst E.K. von Langwerth's Brigade 1st Line Battalion K.G.L.

2nd Line Battalion K.G.L. Light Companies K.G.L.

Brig. Gen. Sigismund von Löwe's Brigade 5th Line Battalion K.G.L. 7th Line Battalion K.G.L.

2nd Division

Major-General Rowland Hill

Maj. Gen. Christopher Tilson's Brigade 1/3rd (East Kent-The Buffs) Foot 2/48th (Northhamptonshire) Foot 2/66th (Berkshire) Foot One co. 5/60th (Royal American) Foot Brig. Gen. Richard Stewart's Brigade 29th (Worcestershire) Foot 1/48th (Northhamptonshire) Foot 1st Battalion of Detachments

3rd Division

Maj. Gen. Alexander Mackenzie Maj. Gen. Alexander Mackenzie's Brigade 2/24th (2nd Warwickshire) Foot

2/24th (2nd Warwickshire) Foot 2/31st (Huntingdonshire) Foot 1/45 (1st Nottinghamshire) Foot Colonel Rufane S. Donkin's Brigade

2/87 (Prince of Wales's Irish) Foot 1/88 (Connaught Rangers) Foot Five companies 5/60th (Royal American) Foot

4th Division

Maj. Gen. Alexander Campbell Maj. Gen. Alexander Campbell's Brigade 2/7th (Royal Fusiliers)

2/53rd (Shropshire) Foot

One company 5/60th (Royal American) Foot Col. James Kemmis's Brigade

1/40th (2nd Somersetshire) Foot 97th (Queen's Germans) 2nd Battalion of Detachments

One company 5/60th (Royal American) Foot

Cavalry Division

Lt-Gen. William Payne Maj. Gen. Henry Fane's Brigade

3rd (Prince of Wales) Dragoon Guards

4th (Queen's Own) Dragoons Maj. Gen. Stapleton Cotton's Brigade

14th (Duchess of York's Own) Light Dragoons 16th (Queen's Light) Dragoons

Maj. Gen. George Anson's Brigade 23rd Light Dragoons 1st Light Dragoons K.G.L

Artillery: three British and two K.G.L batteries

OPTIONAL

Maj. Gen. Robert Craufurd's Light Brigade 2/43rd (Monmouthshire) Light Infantry 1/52nd (Oxford) Light Infantry 1/95th Rifles

The Army of Extremadura

Teniente General Don Gregorio García de la Cuesta, Captain-General of Old Castile

Van Division

Brigadier José Pascual de Zayas

2nd Barbastro Cazadores (1)

2nd Volunteers of Catalonia Infantry (1)

Campo Mayor Cazadores (1)

Valencia Alcántara y Albuquerque Cazadores (1)

Volunteers of Valencia Cazadores (1)

1st Division

Mariscal de Campo Duke del Parque
3/Cantabria Line Infantry (1)
Canarias Militia (?)
Guadix Provincial Militia (1)
Triadores of Cádiz Light Infantry (1)
3rd Provincial Grenadiers (1)

2nd Division

MdC Vicente Iglesias

2nd Majorca Infantry (1?) Vélez-Málaga Volunteers (3) Osuna Line Infantry (2) Burgos Provincial Militia (1) Extranjeros Volunteer Infantry (1)

3rd Division

MdC Marquis de Portago

Imperial of Toledo Infantry (1) Antequera Cazadores (1) Guadix Provincial Militia (1) Badajoz Infantry (2) Badajoz Provincial Militia (1)

4th Division

MdC Rafael Manglano

2-3/Irlanda Line Infantry (2) Jaén Line Infantry (2) Leales de Fernando VII Militia (2) La Corona Volunteer Line Infantry (1) 3rd Sevilla Volunteer Infantry (1) 2nd Madrid Volunteer Infantry (1) 5th Division

MdC Luis Alejandro Bassecourt

1st Royal Marine Regiment (2)

Africa Line Infantry (1)

Reina Line Infantry (1)

Murcia Line Infantry (2)

Sigüenza Provincial Militia (1)

1st Cavalry Division

Ten. Gen. Juan de Henestrosa
Rey Line Cavalry (4)
Calatrava Dragoons (remnant)
Cazadores de Sevilla (2)
Sagrario de Toledo Cazadores (2)
Villaviciosa Dragoons (remnant)
Lustiania Dragoons (3)
Cazadores de Madrid (1)
Voluntarios Espana Cazadores (2)

2nd Cavalry Division

Ten. Gen. Duque De Albuerquerque
Royal Guard Carabineers (1)
Infante Line Cavalry (2)
Almansa Dragoons (4)
Pavia Dragoons (1)
1st Extremadura Hussars (2)
2nd Extremadura Hussars (2)

6 heavy, 20 medium and 4 light guns.

The Army of King Joseph the First

Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain Marshal Jean-Bapitiste Jourdan, Military Advisor

1st Corps

Marshal Claude Victor Perrin

1st Division

General de Division Francois-Amable Ruffin GB LaBruyere

9th Light (3) ("L'Incomparable") 24th Line (3)

GB Barrois 96th Line (3)

2nd Division

GD Pierre-Bellon Lapisse

GB Solignac (?)

8th Line (3) 54th Line (3)

GB LaPlannes

16th Light (3) 45th Line (3)

3rd Division

GD Eugene Villatte

GB Cassagne 27th Light (3)

63rd Line (3)

GB Puthod (?) 94th Line (3)

95th Line (3)

95th Line (

I Corps Cavalry GB Beamont

> 2nd Hussars 5th Chasseurs

Artillery- 48 guns (6x12lb, 18x 6lb foot, 12x 6lb horse)

IV Corps

GD Horace-François-Bastien Sebastiani

1st Division

GD Horace-François-Bastien Sebastiani

GB Rey

28th Line (3) 32nd Line (3) "Le Brave"

GB Liger-Belair

58th Line (3) 75th Line (3)

2nd Division

GD Valence

4th Polish (2)
3rd "Division de la Confederation du Rhin"

GD Jean Leval

Generalmajor Heinrich Von Porbeck 2nd Nassau (2)

GB Chasse

2nd Hollanders (1) 4th Hollanders (1)

4th Baden (2)

GM von Schaefer

2nd Hesse-Darmstadt Gross-und Erbprinz Regt (2) Frankfort Bn (1)

IV Corps Cavalry

GD Philippe-Antoine Merlin GB Strolz

GB Stroiz

10th Chasseurs (4) 26th Chasseurs (4)

Number in parenthesis is number of battalions, if unknown or questionable, marked with "?".



GD Merlin

Polish Vistula Lancers (4) Westphalian Chevaux-Legers (4)

Artillery- 30 guns. (Two Dutch (one horse and one foot) and one Baden battery. One French horse battery.)

Reserve Cavalry

1st Dragoon Division

GD Victor Latour-Maubourg

1st Dragoons (4) 2nd Dragoons (4)

GB Oldenbourg (d'Oullembourg)

4th Dragoons (4) 9th Dragoons (4)

GB Digeon

14th Dragoons (4) 26th Dragoons (4)

26th Dragoons

2nd Dragoon Division

GD Edouard-Jean-Baptiste Milhaud GB Boye (Boyer de Rebeval?)

5th Dragoons (4) 12th Dragoons (4) 3rd Dutch Hussars (4)

GB Maupetit (?)

16th Dragoons (4) 20th Dragoons (4)

21st Dragoons(4)

1 Horse Battery

Dessolles' Division

GD Jean-Joseph-Paul Dessolles GB Godinot

12th Light (3)

51st Line (3)

103rd Line (1 -incorporated in the 51st)

27th Chasseurs (2)

Guardia Real

GB Saligny

Kings's Guard, Grenadiers (2) Kings's Guard, Tirailleurs (2) King's Guard, Cavalry (2) One foot and one horse battery

OOB & Other Notes

Anders Fager

Putting the order of battles together for this game has been a slightly surreal exercise since most of the detail you find in them is to diminutive to show up in the game. Still, knowing that we have done our best is a gratifying feeling.

The British army was the easiest part to research as there are plenty of sources around to find every imaginable detail in. The only odd units in it are the two "battalions of detachments." These consisted of stragglers and convalescents from Moore's army that had been rounded up in Oporto during the winter and despite being a sad sight they did well during the campaign. The battalions were disbanded after the retreat back to Portugal.

It is worthy to note that the British army at Talavera was not yet the juggernaut of later years. It was still inexperienced, the light infantry tactics were still to mature and its middle leadership was plagued by a fumbling recklessness that thankfully was offset by the bravery and skill of the individual infantry battalions. Playing these scenarios players will find that the British army of 1809 is quite a one-armed weapon. It has excellent, aggressive, infantry but is hopelessly outgunned and forced to rely on erratic cavalry. It will make one realize how important Wellesley's tactical brilliance was to the British army's survival and eventual victory. Finally note that the cased shots that the British had used with great effect in the battles in Portugal did not make it into this game as the army was short on ammunition.

The French Army's OOB was also quite a straightforward affair to research. Its most dubious part is what brigadiers were present and not and if anyone can tell for sure if if LaBruvere had already been replaced by Conroux, feel free to enlighten us (we know that neither Perreimond, Balthazard or Charles-Louise Grandjean was there). Especially Milhaud and Leval's brigadiers are a messy lot, but just to show off we can tell you that GdB Chasse is the very same Chasse who later commanded a Dutch division at Waterloo and that GM von Schaefer is Generalmajor Georg von Schaefer de Bernstein (of Hessen), not GM Konrad von Schaefer (of Nassau). But the later might have been in command of von Porbeck's brigade due to being von Porbeck's senior - that is if he was around and von Porbeck was a colonel as some sources claim. Furthermore it might be worth noting that Leval's multi-national division is considered "French" thanks to Leval's hard work and that Joseph's Spanish Guard mostly consisted of French, Germans and Italians rounded up from depots and hospitals around Madrid. It was a miserable formation, Guard in name only. As a literary note we must finally point out that the Dutch did not lose an eagle during the campaign. The novel "Sharpe's Eagle" has Sharpe capturing a standard the Dutch did not have at the time.

This French Army was one of the last really good forces the French got together in Spain. Despite a year of fighting, and being starved to the bone, Victor's I Corps was still the crack formation that broke the Russian center at Friedland (some of the regiments had been at Eylau as well) and

it had lately caused the Spanish disaster at Medellin The cavalry divisions, although worn thin from endless escort duty, were also still in a league of their own in the Peninsula. The French problem laid in the disjointed command structure. Every Corps commander had became a law unto himself in Spain, and with Napoleon a continent away all cooperation was uneasy and plagued by petty intrigues and quarrels. Caught in the middle of this Joseph lacked the authority and skill to create a unified command and the problem was not solved until Soult was appointed commander of all French forces in Spain.

The Army of Extremadura, finally, is a mess to research and we do even not dream that we got it all right. The strengths of some formations are very much pure guesses as even the latest, top-notch, Spanish research is able to come up with even approximate regimental strengths. We are however eternally grateful to our friend José Manuel Rodríguez Gómez of Talavera (living in hex 14.05) who has done a spectacular job searching the mazes of Spanish military history.

Some points are worth noting.

- After Medellin the surviving cadres had absorbed new recruits. This brought the old regular units up to strength but lowered their quality as well. In some cases units had also been renamed or split up in ways that are very hard to follow.
- The "Provincial Militia" units were no shaky levies. The Provincial Militia was a part of the pre-war regular army, differing from the "Line Infantry" mostly in social make-up.
- The Canarias regiment can be any of three different units named "Canarias" this or "Canarias" that, none who seem to have been even near the Tajo in July 1809.
- The Extranjeros (Foreigner) Infantry probably includes what was left of the Walloon and Spanish Guard battalions who almost died to a man covering the retreat from Medellin.
- The Leales de Fernando VII Militia was as raw a formation can get and had been recruiting in Talavera the days before the battle
- -The Spanish cavalry divisions were a mess of small formations and some squadrons might have been detached at the time of the battle. All of them suffered from starved and untrained mounts. Still, the Rey regiment, commanded by the dashing Don José María de Lastres, carried out the only truly successful cavalry charge during the battle.

All in all, the most extraordinary thing about the Army of Extremadura was that it still existed. It had suffered disastrous defeats and horrible maltreatment, it was starved to the bone and its soldiers lacked equipment and even clothes. Despite all this the army functioned, if somewhat erratically, during the campaign and its operations during the retreat from Talavera were very well conducted.

Making a map for the game was quite an easy job as the area is reasonably well mapped. A power dam covers the northern valley these days, but thanks to the work of hordes of British 19th century historians we are dealing with one of the world's best mapped underwater areas. The actual extent of vegetation was also a bit tricky make out. Several sources mention that by the time of the battle most trees in the neighborhood as well as the roofs of Talavera had been used as firewood by Victor's troops, but oddly enough the very same sources also often mentions this or that unit getting entangled in shrubbery. The simple explanation is probably that while thorns and such are useless for cooking they work quite well as barbed wire. Among others Fortescue's map from History of the British Army was very useful in sort these details out. As for the proper extent of the town, something that can be a nightmare to make out, José Manuel helped us with very good maps that even nailed down the names of churches and major streets. It is also worth noting that outside of the town very few structures has the fortress-like qualities most Central European farm has, most minor farms being shacks and nothing more.

The special rules were save for the command issues, quite easy to design once one remembered that that this is a brigade level game. As few armies of the Napoleonic wars are as surrounded by myth as the Spanish and British and it was an interesting task to figure out how to depict them without restoring to stereotypes. The Spanish army was indeed poorly trained and often badly led, but those legendary routs at the first sight of trouble were a thing of the past even by 1809. Besides those regiments that basically consisted of a flag, a fancy name and six hundred scared recruits, most units could put up a creditable fight unless they had been led into hopeless situations. Once we decided that the panic on the 27th (that might have been the entire Spanish left routing or just the Leales de Fernando VII feeling a bit jumpy, depending on who's story you want to trust) could be written off as one of those freak events game design

should ignore, all we needed was a few rules to show the rather erratic behavior of the pure levies and the Spanish cavalry's dislike for charging cavalry.

We have avoided giving British infantry any super-powers and instead hope that players will provide the correct aggressive downhill behavior and not have any faith in static shooting matches. We are other hand exaggerating the effect of the Barker rifles at the battle, as most of those where parceled out in 50 man groups among the brigades. Besides, the legendary Light Division, a formation that when featured in its full glory will be a law unto itself, was not even at the battle.

After this the French Army was simple to depict, all that remained to show was the ups and downs of the ranking officers involved. Joseph had lost control over the events, was arriving late and had neither experience nor authority to get a new grip on things. Meanwhile, the experienced Victor had his blood up and forgot about both tactics and co-ordination, and Jourdan, perhaps the most experienced officer on the field, did not lift a hand to help his boss. In fact, Jourdan's counter in the game should probably be thought of more as the meager staff resources Joseph had to his disposal rather than Jourdan himself. Besides this note of explanation, the French command rules are quite self-explanatory.

On the Allied side the British divisional commanders committed some amazing blunders and the Spanish staff's flair for endlessly confirming and reconfirming orders caused some truly glacial reaction times (To this day no one can tell for sure when Albuerquerque moved north to support Hill.). Despite these problems Wellesley and Cuesta worked fine together during the battle, something most nationalistic narratives of the battle desperately try to overlook. There was surely no love lost between the two, and while they went through great pains to embarrass each other during the campaign they were both far to smart to start acting up on the battlefield. Anyhow, this was just a question of pouring dirt into the command rules. The hardest part was how to show Wellesley's flair for micro-management without shutting down the entire command system, and the way the rule work now is a compromise that will serve the British fine as long as he is defending on a not too wide frontage. Launching a big attack will be quite another matter.

The First Invasion of Spain

Geoffrey Wolfarth

Having been cleared of any incompetence over the debacle of the Vimeiro armistice conditions, Wellesley returned to Lisbon on 22nd April 1809 as Commander-in-Chief of both the British and Portuguese armies. He took over from Sir John Craddock, who had been left with a force of 10,000 British troops in Portugal when Moore had marched of on the ill-fated advance that ended in the retreat to Couronna. He spent some time organising the Commissariat to solve the never-ending problem of how to supply his troops in inhospitable terrain, and when enough of Moore's old troops had returned he marched north with 18,000 men to "beat or cripple Soult." Soult, who had moved rather aimlessly south after Couronna, was now sitting with some 13,000 troops at Oporto in Northen Portugal. He intended to withdraw back to Spain and not to engage Wellesley, whom he thought could not cross the wide river Douro. But Wellesley, capitalising on the enterprise of his staff officers in finding small boats to ferry the men over the river, pushed Soult and his force unceremoniously out of the town and forced him to retreat over a goat track across the Sierra Do Sante Catalina, leaving behind their artillery, reserve ammunition, several eagles, a and military war chest containing some £50,000.

After this success, Wellesley marched against the remaining French force threatening Portugal's eastern frontier. Victor, with 20,000 men, was lying at Merida. Victor had orders to attack Lisbon in conjunction with Soult once he moved south from Oporto, but for obvious reasons Soult could not move. Consequently, Victor did nothing other than observe a small covering force that Wellesley had previous sent in his direction and more relevantly the large Spanish army under Cuesta, which was manoeuvring to his south.

Following his orders from London, Wellesley arranged with Cuesta, through prolonged and difficult diplomacy, to make a joint move towards Madrid with a view to inducing Victor and other nearby French forces to attack him. Although Cuesta was as "obstinate as any gentleman at the head of an army ought to be," the combined armies were eventually concentrated at Talavera, where on the 27th and 28th of July they were attacked by the combined corps of King Joseph, Victor and Sebastiani.

In the battle, the French virtually ignored the Spanish and concentrated their attack on the troops of the British and their German allies. The French made several attacks that were bloodily repulsed with some 7,000 casualties. However, having received news that another Spanish army was possibly moving against their rear, the French withdrew, leaving Wellesley and Cuesta in possession of the battlefield. However, no pursuit took place since the British, having lost a quarter of their troops, were too exhausted, and the Spanish simply refused. The Light Brigade,

under Crauford, having marched more than 40 miles in 26 hours, arrived at the scene. Although they were too late to fight, they took over the exhausting and gruesome task of collecting the dead and tidying up the battlefield.

The British stayed at Talavera for six days but were desperately short of food, since the Spanish authorities had failed to deliver the promised supplies, and eventually Wellesley decided to withdraw back to Portugal. He was obliged to do so, since from a captured despatch he had learnt that Soult was advancing against his communications with Portugal, gathering troops from Asturias and Leon on the way. Indeed, about the time when Wellesley received this intelligence, there had already been a cavalry skirmish some 35 miles to the west of Talavera, and Soult had reached Plasencia. The British marched away westward along the south bank of the Tajo, with the Light Brigade dashing ahead to secure the vital bridge at Almaraz, which was the only crossing by which Soult could have intercepted them. By the end of August Wellesley and his troops were safe back in Portugal.

Por la Relijión, por la Patria, por Fernando VII. Vencer o morir¹

José Manuel Rodríguez Gómez

The main reason for the Talavera campaign was politics. In the summer of 1809 the Spanish Junta Central had, after suffering severe criticism for the defeats during the winter, managed to restore some order among the different factions fighting the French invaders. In fact the Junta Central seemed more and more like an actual government. But it needed to secure its prestige both among the Spanish people and towards its ally Great Britain. The Junta needed a victory and Cornel, the pro-British Minister of War came up with a plan to retake Madrid, that - if nothing else was achieved - held great symbolic value. Such an attack had as Cornel's saw it a fair chance of success as Napoleon was out of Spain, the two most dangerous French Corps



(those commanded by Ney and Soult) were far to the North, in Galicia, and a British corps was at hand at Portugal.

To recapture the Spanish capital Cornel envisioned a pincer movement using the Army of Extremadura, commanded by Gen. Gregorio Garcia de la Cuesta and the Army of La Mancha, commanded by Gen. Francisco Javier Venegas. Cuesta was to attack from the West, along the Royal Road from Extremadura and Venegas, at Despeñaperros, should attack from the South. Cuesta would be in command of the operation and he was supposed to be able to count on the support of Wellesley's British Corps that was to join him in his march on Madrid while Venegas distracted the French.

On paper the plan had some merit. But things proved to be easier said than done. After the first meeting between the Allied commanders, at Puerto de Miravete on July 10th, it stood clear that Wellesley and Cuesta did not understand each other on several points. Firstly, Cuesta saw Wellington as an ally while Wellesley saw Cuesta □s Army as a barely useful auxiliary corps and also doubted Cuesta

s abilities. Furthermore, Wellesley got involved with pro-British officers in the Spanish army that conspired against Cuesta, aiming to get Wellesley named as Generalisimo of all Spanish forces. The two generals also viewed the campaign differently. For the Spanish nothing was more important than retaking the Kingdom's capital while for the British the campaign was just a small part of a grand scheme to defeat Napoleon and if Madrid was held by French at the end of the season or not did not matter much to them. Furthermore, as Great Britain's army was small and precious, Wellesley was not allowed to risk his units in hazardous operations.

Relations between the Allies were also soured over logistical problems. The British army had had supply problems even while still inside Portugal and when the Junta directed the army through areas with ripe fields the British proved unable to help themselves the way a French or Spanish army would have done. Instead both armies were forced to rely on the poorly organized and stocked Spanish depots and for the British leaders this and the lack of transports, was seen as virtual insults. These things were to prove critical as the Tajo valley, where the armies were to fight, was completely depleted of even hay.

The advance to Talavera was an easy task. Victor's French were outnumbered and, additionally, both allied armies were rested as well as still quite well supplied. But things changed when they were at Talavera. As Victor withdrew behind the Alberche Wellesley deployed his forces to attack, but Cuesta did not feel that an attack across a creek and up a hill against a well-prepared enemy was a good idea before guns could be brought up. While Wellesley and Cuesta argued Victor sneaked away.

¹ For the Religion, for the Fatherland, for Ferdinand VIIth. Win or die.- Motto on the standard of the Spanish Guards' 4th battalion.

At Talavera the Allied commanders were also informed that Venegas, for no apparent reason, had been delayed. In fact, Venegas was disobeying orders and was advancing not on Ocaña and Aranjuez as planned but on the easily defended town Toledo. Wellesley pointed out the difficulties of advancing without Venegas pressing on French left and also argued about the lack of supplies and transports for his own corps.

This is an important point. Wellesley wrote in letters during the whole campaign that starvation was decimating his army and about the frustrating lack of importance the Junta Central paid to feeding the two armies. This was, as other British leaders recognised an exaggeration but served as the perfect excuse for Wellesley to avoid further advances in Cuesta \(\sigma \) support. Futhermore, Wellesley had begun playing a very dangerous game. Some of Cuesta's subordinate officers were very dissatisfied with his command and among them the most conspicuous was Lt. Gen. Alburquerque, a pro-British officer who was after Cuesta's command for himself. And Wellesley had fueled their conspiracies against Cuesta, thus opening a wider gap between the two commanders.

With discontent stiring in his ranks, Cuesta decided to march on to Madrid as he had been ordered to do. But when he ran into the now advancing Victor on July 26th he realized that his army was both outnumbered and unable to stand up against the French, he reluctantly admitted not only to the danger his army was in but to the actual failure of the whole operation. The only chance for him to survive was to retreat to Talavera. There Wellesley had not been completely inactive but had instead planned how to fight a defensive battle against French. Cuesta submitted to the plan and battle was joined.

The outcome of the battle is well known. But the defensive victory of the allied armies could not hide the failure of the grand plan. None of its goals had been achieved and not even the French retreat could change that.

The Spanish troops fought well given the circumstances and the officers forgot their differences while facing the enemy. But these differences were the seeds for future dissidence that would affect not only the Army but also the Central Junta. And while the British soldiers fought very well, their officers had failed completely to understand the Spanish mind, the Spanish way to wage war and, most important, the Spanish motivations to continue on fighting after their heavy defeats. This lack of understanding did ballast the allied side just as much as Venegas

movements did.

The campaign ended with the Spanish defeat at Almonacid (August 11th), where Venegas army suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat, the retreat of Wellesley \Box s corps to Portugal, a maneuver of his own device that left Cuesta alone to face Soult \Box s army (formed by three French corps, 2nd, 5th and 6th), something that led to defeat of Cuesta \Box s rearguard at Puente del Arzobispo (August 8th).

Tired and ill, General Cuesta had a stroke that forced him to resign his command. At the beginning of 1810 he died in Badajoz.

The Madrid View

Anders Fager with Dave Jones

By the beginning of 1809 it was clear to Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain,that his brother had set him up. Badly. Spain was an awful place, indifferent to his best intentions. Joseph's subjects loathed or even pitied him, and the same could be said about most of his army. The French generals in Spain did not even answer to him, but to Napoleon, and to add further insult, Joseph had received the rather uninspired Marshal Jourdan as his military advisor.

Powerless to interfere, the two watched as the war in Spain had taken on a life of itself. Only the eastern and central parts of the country were relatively calm. The vital northeast was in firm French control; in Aragon, Suchet (V Corps) was fighting Blake; in Catalonia, St Cyr (VII Corps) was fighting to open the Barcelona road; and south of Madrid, Sebastiani (IV Corps) was watching the mountain passes to still hostile Andalusia and Valencia. Meanwhile, west of Madrid, Victor (I Corps) stood on the Tajo, eyeing Cuesta, who had been reinforced since Victor had crushed him at Medellin in March. In Leon, north of Madrid, Soult (II Corps) was recovering from being thrown out of Portugal; and, north of him, Ney (VI Corps) was chasing guerrillas with Mortier (III Corps) coming up from Zaragosa to join him in what proved to be yet another shadow-hunt.

Napoleon, busy at the villages Aspern and Essling in distant Austria, did not offer much advice, and the few orders that reached Spain were ill-informed and outdated. But nobody felt like telling the Emperor that his plan of capturing Gibraltar by the way of Oporto and Lisbon was pure nonsense. Instead his orders were acted upon either with extreme discretion or not at all. By quiet agreement the French commanders seem to have decided to wait and see; and it is somehow telling that Ney and Soult, the most distinguished commanders present, did the least good. In April Napoleon had ordered the two to pacify Galicia, but their offensive came to nothing, as they spent all their time quarrelling. (It got to a point were they almost drew their swords at each other and had to be restrained.) Then, just as thing had calmed down in early July, Napoleon made Soult commander of all three corps in Galicia. Ney went ballistic again and this embarrassing farce shut the entire army down for another couple of weeks.

On the Tajo, Marshal Victor spent most of his time trying to keep his troops from starving to death. Since mid-April he had started to suspect that Cuesta was up to something, but the guerrillas that controlled the countryside kept him from finding out about the approach of the British. Just to be safe Victor drew his corps together at Talavera and sent repeated pleas for reinforcements. But Joseph ignored him, as he was busy trying to make sense of what Venegas' Army of La Mancha was up to south of Madrid.

Wellesley and the British Army had entered Spain on July 4, but it was not until about two weeks later that Victor realised this, and, screaming for help, made preparations to retire. This news reached Madrid on the 22nd; and, at the same time, letters from Soult arrived reporting that the British seemed to be advancing up the Tajo. Soult also proposed that he should march south through the Pass of Banos to Plasencia and the Tajo, cutting Wellesley off from Portugal. Joseph agreed, as he had learnt that a happy Soult carrying out his own designs was preferable over a sulking one. Thus, having launched some 35,000 men at the Allied rear and effectively destroyed their plan of campaign, King Joseph set about to aid Victor. Many unflattering observations have been made about the military skills of Joseph Bonaparte, but he was no fool. He understood the situation well and gave Sebastiani's corps and the other formations around Madrid orders worthy of his brother. He would march with every man at hand to Victor's aid, while Venegas, correctly identified as the decoy of the allied plan, was to be all but ignored. Only a small garrison under Bellaird was left to guard the capital.

When Wellesley's and Cuesta's troops appeared before Talavera on July 24, Victor retreated behind the Alberche river. He made a bold show the next day, but withdrew before he was attacked. When Victor shrunk away east towards Madrid on the evening of the 25th, all Allied hopes of destroying his corps were gone. Stuck in a logistical Black Hole, their most prudent action would have been to call the offensive off and retire. But instead, Cuesta decided to advance on Madrid, and on the 26th he ran into Victor, who had linked up with Joseph and was heading west again. After a furious cavalry engagement the Spanish got a head start back towards Talavera.

Considering the chaotic French command structure, they had initially reacted amazingly well to the British advance. No one had deliberately ignored or obstructed Joseph, and even Soult operated with a purpose. But with victory within reach, everything changed for the worse. The pursuit on the 27th was conducted by Victor's infantry alone, without the support of the powerful cavalry divisions. The tired French failed to catch up with Cuesta on the 27th, and the trap sprung at Casa de Salinas only hurt British's pride. In effect Victor fought the Allied armies by himself, and, had Wellesley only realized this, I Corps could have been in great danger.

The French command problems persisted through the battle at Talavera. Joseph neither supported nor restrained Victor's energetic attacks, and, except for the final furious assault the veteran I Corps fought the allies alone. It is easy to blame Victor for being rash and headstrong, but he was most likely assuming that because he was in contact with the enemy, and knew the area well, he was to be trusted to make the right decisions until Joseph had grasped the situation. (This "letting the man on the spot be the boss" method had worked remarkably well at other times. At Montebello 1800 Victor had allowed Lannes,

whom he outranked, to make use of his corps as it arrived, letting Lannes run the battle.). It is likewise easy to understand Joseph's refusal to order a final attack, as he had just learnt that Soult was delayed and Venegas was showing signs of life. At nightfall the French withdrew east, with Victor resuming his position of the 25th.

From a French perspective the battle at Talavera was a total failure, and the horrible mauling they dealt the British was in every bit returned in kind. On the other hand there is no doubt that while the Allies won the battle and thus got Joseph's army to leave them alone, their campaign was already a complete failure. In fact, had the battle not been fought Wellesley would have had nothing to show for his pains, a situation reminiscent of the aftermath of both Corona and Salamanca. Now the spectacle of battle made people forget that in the end the French trap slammed shut. Soult did chase the British out of Spain; and had Wellesley lingered longer than he did at Talavera, he would probably had been doomed. In the end it was the Spanish who had to bear the French wrath alone, with Venegas being beaten at Almonacid and Cuesta at Puente del Arzobispo.

The campaign's consequences were far-reaching and mostly unintended, well in line with the operational confusion. The only part of Spain that was liberated by the campaign was Galicia in the far Northwest, because as Ney withdrew to follow Soult, La Romana and others quickly re-established Spanish control. The experience of dealing with Cuesta and the Junta convinced Wellesley that co-operating with the Spanish was hopeless, and that he should limit himself to defending Portugal until unity of command and superior local strength was achieved. The privations of his troops also made him aware of the monstrous supply problems that an advance into Spain faced, and it took him years of meticulous preparations to create a sound foundation for an offensive.

As for the Spanish Army, Cuesta led his men to safety before he left his command in August. Sick and unable to even hold an administrative post, he retired. He died soon afterwards. His replacement, Areizaga, was put in charge of the largest Spanish Army of the entire war, and promptly led it to its utter destruction. On the 19th November he faced Soult at Ocana south of Madrid; and, in a few hours fighting, the Army of the Centre ceased to exist. The creation of a large French army under one commander (Soult) was perhaps the only far-reaching effect the Talavera campaign had on the French, and, after crushing Areizaga, Soult's command was soon put to further use. The next year his command would invade Andalusia and eventually get bogged down in three years of the same kind of war as the French had been trying to win in Galicia.

French Players Notes

As the French Player you have a fine army with good units of all arms and both your cavalry and artillery is far superior to anything the Allies got. Unfortunately your host is led by the hesitant King Joseph and to makes things worse it arrives pell-mell to the battlefield with Joseph bringing up the rear. This is far from an ideal situation and victory will depend on how good you are at getting the army to function despite this.

Early in the game, after chasing Mackenzie out of Casa de Salinas, you'll have to make a key decision and that is "which way to go?" The historical choice is to follow Victor □s plan of capturing Cerro de Medellin. This means throwing yourself at the best defensive position on the board guarded by the enemy's best troops, but that is a risk you have to take. With a bit of patience you can work your way up the valley of Casa de Valdefuentes to broaden your front, but sooner or later you need to charge uphill. At the very least you will seriously damage the British army and with a bit of luck capture the hill as well. And if you succeed in winning the Medellin, victory is yours as from there it is downhill all the way to the Tajo. Adieu Lord Wellington. But be careful, because if you enthusiastically wreck I Corps at an early stage your attacks on the July 28th will suffer as the Allied army will be free to re-deploy his reserves against what you have left.

As an alternative to this "go get them-approach" you may prefer to keep up a more even pressure on the Allies, starting at first light of July 28th. Select a key point carefully and start to maul it. The area between Pajar de Vergara and the Medellin is a great killing ground for your artillery to play on, and with patience you can grind down the defenders and create a hole for

you troops to attack into. An attack on or just north of Pajar de Vergara can smash the center of the Allied line, allowing you to envelop at least part of one of the two Allied armies. That is, if you can keep your flanks properly guarded. Do not expect the Allies to sit idle and watch your clever moves

Trying to ignore the British and attacking only the Spanish army is not a such a wise move as it might seem. Fighting in the shrubbery west of Talavera is slow and renders your artillery useless. So is fighting along the sunken road or in the town itself. Also, the Allied player may spring the "Enough" rule on you, leaving you with little to show for your efforts as it near impossible to catch enough of the fleeing Spanish army to make your effort worthwhile.

Also, remember to use your cavalry and reserve units, even though they are awkward to get moving thanks to Joseph's limited capabilities. They have not come to Talavera just to watch I and IV Corps fight. Desolles' division can be used to man part of the French line, thus saving regiments for the main attacks and may also be put to good use as a "breakthrough reserve" to be unleashed westwards. As the terrain gets less and less cavalry-friendly the further west the fighting moves it can be hard to put the Dragoons to good use, but in a perfect world you will manage to get them into action before the British has taken cover behind the Portina.

Two final pieces of advice. Learn to live with the squabbling French generals and put all of them to work, not only Victor. Do not refrain from ordering something just because it will take some time to get it done. And, do not underestimate the Spaniards. They have a number of quality units that properly used can threaten your flanks or turn a setback into a rout by a sudden cavalry charge.



Allied Players Notes

It is a demanding exercise for the Allied player to simultaneously command these two utterly different armies, and it is even more difficult to co-ordinate their actions. But this is a key point for you as no matter what their commanders think, the armies need each other's support. They have to co-operate, and there is one thing worse than having an ally and that is, as Churchill once said, having none.

Playing the Allies there are three things you have to keep in mind. First: the Spaniards are soldiers too. You need them. Second: your reserves are very limited. Three: the Medellin can be outflanked both from the North or South. Remember these points and you will be fine. Sort of. The French will come at you like a crazed pitbull, so brace yourself.

Be prepared to defend the Medellin and Pajar de Vergara to the last man as the loss of these will spell your defeat. Properly manned, with artillery in support and local reserves at hand, they are both fine strongpoints for the French divisions to break against. Also, note that unless you want conduct a massive regrouping with the mercurial Victor as a spectator you are stuck with the British on the Medellin and the Spanish around the Pajar. Learn to live with it. Quick movements are tricky among the olives west of the Portina, something that will cause endless frustration, not only for you but for any French breakthrough as well.

Husbanding reserves and forming a second line is a hard task. Besides one of the weaker British divisions, you'll have one good Spanish division and a few cavalry units to spare and that is about it. A retreat behind Talavera's walls will also free one division to act as reserve behind the right wing of Allied lines. Be aware that if the French starts working the northern flank of the Medellin it will take time to get fresh troops up there.

Finally, do not allow the French player to think he has the initiative. Counterattack if you have clear chances to do so.

Good luck and good gaming.



Battle Notes

Jerry Malone

On the morning of July 27th, the Army of Extremadura crossed the Alberche in some disorder. Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's divisions were on the eastern bank of the river in case the French renewed their pursuit, but Victor had decided to slow down to rest his men and horses.

As the last of the Spaniards reached the west bank of the Alberche, French cavalry were spotted to the east. Wellesley ordered Sherbrooke's division to retire and proceed to its position north of Talavera, while Mackenzie was ordered to move over the Alberche and halt near the ruined, fortress-like structure of Casa de Salinas. The Britsh fell back, burning several buildings along the river.

At Casa de Salinas Mackenzie's two brigades used the shade of the trees to escape the July sun and tried to rest. They were unaware that Victor's van, Lapisse 's Division, had used the smoke from the fires to cross the Alberche undetected. Therefore the British were taken completely by

surprise when the 16 Light attacked, killing some men before they could rise. Wellesley, who had climbed to the roof of the casa, narrowly escaped capture. Donkin's inexperienced brigade was broken, with some of the shaken troops firing on each other amidst the confusion. The French overranthe 2/31 st of Mackenzie's brigade as well, while the 5/60th, though shaken, stood firm long enough for Wellesley to begin to restore some sense of order. He brought forward the 45th, the veteran "Old Stubborns", and created a rallying point for his troops. As the French attack slowed down, Donkin's shaken command reformed and, with Wellesley temporarily in command, Mackenzie's division retreated to the line along the Portina, supported by Anson's cavalry. French artillery harassed the retreating redcoats, but the action was at an end. This short but sharp action had cost the British 440 casualties and the French less than 100.

The Allied position was an area well known to both sides, as Victor had used Talavera as a base until a few days before. The Allied right was anchored on the ghost town of Talavera, and the line travelled north along a mostly dry stream, the Portina, to the Cerro de Cascajal, a hill that commanded the battlefield. Though both flanks

were secure, the center was deployed in open terrain with little or no cover.

Though Talavera's walls were in a state of disrepair, they could still provide protection against an attack. Deployed east of them were the Spanish Van and 1st Divisions, and four regiments of cavalry continued the line to the Tagus. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions then stretched northward from the town to the Pajar de Vergara in a double line, where they met Wellesley's right. The Spanish position was made stronger by vineyards, walls, and enclosures that would aid in defense. In reserve behind these troops were 10 regiments of Spanish cavalry and Bassecourt's 5th Division.

The Pajar de Vergara, roughly in the center of the Allied position, was a small knoll with the most rudimentary of fortifications erected upon it. Wellesley and Cuesta had decided that this portion of the battlefield would be Spanish responsibility, but a battery of 3 pounders under Lawson was placed there. On his left came the troops of Campbell's 4th Division, and, north of them, Sherbrooke's strong 1st Division was deployed in a single line. These troops held the most exposed portion of the line as they had no natural protection from enemy fire. To the rear of the 1st Division was Mackenzie's battered Division and the British cavalry. On the extreme left the most trusted of the British commanders. General Hill and his 2nd Division, held the Cerro de Medellin.

Late in the afternoon Milhaud's dragoons advanced through the olive and cork trees to probe the Allied right. The troopers fired a few pistol shots and set into motion one of the more infamous Talavera incidents. Four raw Spanish battalions facing the dragoons fired off a volley and then promptly routed. Some two thousand troops ran from the field, but the Spanish officers quickly restored the line.

As calm settled in over the field, the Allies tried to settle in and prepare themselves for battle the next morning. Most were exhausted by the last 15 hours of marching and skirmishing with little or no food. Unknown to Wellesley there was a near-fatal flaw in Hill's dispositions on the Cerro de Medellin. The brigades of Stewart and Tilson were placed far west of their intended place (the crest of the Cerro), and Langwerth and Lowe believed they were in the second line and had thrown only a token picket line out.

Victor, on Cerro de Cascajal facing the Medellin, knew that the Medellin was key to the field. He was confident that the Allied army was worn out, as he had punished the Spanish, and the British had performed rather badly at Salinas. Night attacks were considered risky, but Victor thought that a surprise attack by Ruffin's tough veterans might push the British from the heights. In support Lapisse's division was ordered to create a noisy demonstration on the British center.

Ruffin's troops got moving in battalion columns at 9:00pm. The 9th Light was to attack frontally, and the other two regiments were to seek out the

British flanks and turn them. In the darkness a French column passed just to the north of Donkin's brigade but it was assumed to be friendly and no alert was sounded. As the 9th scrambled up the steep hill, they came upon the sleeping, unprepared men of Lowe's KGL brigade and routed them. Shouting "Allemande" and "Espanioles" as they attacked, two battalions of the 9th Light reached the crest and it seemed as if they would indeed capture the heights.

Hill rushed to the scene. He mistakenly believed the troops to his front were the 3rd Foot until a French volley killed his aide. Cries of "the hill, the hill" ran through Stewart's' men and Stewart rushed his Battalion of Detachments forward. When Hill had formed up Stewart's remaining battalions, he led them forward to the east crest of the Medellin. The 9th Light was on top of the hill trying to sort itself out when the 29th Foot smashed into them and drove them off the hill. Volleys from the 29th and the 1st Battalion of Detachments then defeated the third battalion of the 9th and secured the hill. This ended Ruffin's attack as the 96th Line had got caught up volleying with Langwerth's men and the 24th Line had got lost in the darkness and north of the Medellin. Victor's gamble had cost both armies about 300 casualties.

Wellesley used the rest of the night to organize his position on the Medellin while his men tried to get a few hours of sleep. The rumble of artillery pieces from the French lines kept many of them awake. During the night Senarmont, commander of I Corps' artillery, carefully deployed the French guns to create the most destructive fire zones. Some guns were pushed forward to within 600 yards of the Allied lines, and behind them, the corps' infantry formed. To the south Sebastiani's 4th Corps filed in, with Sebastiani's division, then Valence and lastly Leval's division of German troops. Milhaud's dragoons held the southern portion of the line and were the only troops facing the Spanish. Latour-Maubourg's dragoons were behind the 4th Corps.

Undeterred by the results of the night attack, Victor was still confident of victory. He sent a note to Joseph, who was still hours away, that he could win by attacking with only I Corps. Joseph agreed to a new attack as long as 4th Corps did not participate. In a flurry of conditional orders, Victor planned his battle. Ruffin's tired troops were again to attack the Medellin and once the summit was gained, Lapisse and Villatte were to attack. Only then would the 4th Corps advance.

At 5:00 am a single cannon fired the signal for French guns to open fire. Well-placed guns tore great gaps in the exposed British troops and the weak British artillery could not reply. Wellesley had made the troops on the Medellin fall back to the reverse slopes to escape the bombardment, but Sherbrooke's men had no such cover and had to withstand the barrage. Under the cover of mist and smoke, Ruffin's columns moved forward again. The French quickly scaled the hill's heights, only to meet Hill's six battalions. The first volley staggered the French, and, as

they struggled to deploy into line their formations began to disintegrate. Sherbrooke sent the 5th Battalion of the KGL to flank the French, and Stewart on the Medellin ordered his troops to charge the reeling enemy. At the sight of the advancing British, the French broke and fled. In the forty minutes Ruffin's division had lost 1300 men, over 25% of their strength. Hill's command had suffered 750 casualties. As Hill had been wounded slightly in the head Tilson assumed command of the division.

On the hill opposite, Victor called off further attacks. The French artillery continued firing for the next hour, then ceased. By now the July sun was beating down on both armies and an informal truce was called to collect the wounded and water from the Portina. In a scene to be repeated many times throughout the war, the British and French troops, who only minutes before had been enemies, met and fraternised for a couple of hours.

About 10:00 am Joseph and Jourdan arrived at Victor's headquarters. Joseph, who was in overall command on a battlefield for the first time, was very composed. In the hour-long conference Victor firmly held the opinion that an attack with both corps could defeat the Allied army. Other officers present were not so confident. Jourdan felt another frontal attack would fail and argued that Victor should have turned the British by occupying the narrow valley north of Cerro de Medillin. The decision was further complicated by the fact that the same day Soult was scheduled to arrive at Plasencia, effectively cutting the British off from Portugal. News from Madrid had also arrived that Venegas was at last moving toward the capital and the token force watching him could only hold out for a couple of days. Finally the ever-present shadow of Joseph's brother forced an aggressive move, and Joseph approved an attack by the 1st and 4th Corps, supported on the right by a cavalry division.

As the French conferred, Wellesley strengthened his position. He sent Fane's and Anson's cavalry to the valley north of the Medellin and repositioned half of a KGL battery to cover the area. Cuesta, whose relationship with Wellesley's had so far been contentious and strained, promptly sent Bassecourt's 5th Division, a half battery of 12 pounders, and Albuquerque's cavalry division north. Bassecourt's men took position in the northern valley and on the slopes of the Sierra de Segurilla. Albuquerque's division started north but arrived after the next action had already begun.

The French planned a general attack all along the line. Ruffin and Villatte, supported by Merlin's cavalry, would move up the valley between the Cerro de Medellin and the Sierra de Segurilla. All the other divisions were to attack the British line from the Pajar de Vergara northward, with only some cavalry, Dessolles' brigade, and the Royal Guard held in reserve.

At 2:00pm, 80 French guns opened fire on the British line again. Luckily for the British, the cannonade was over quickly and a screen of

tirailleurs emerged from the smoke. Only on the Cerro de Cascajal did the French artillery remain firing, as Victor had decided to see how the rest of the attack fared before moving Ruffin and Villatte forward.

Leval's Germans on the French left hit the Allies first at the Pajar de Vergara. The division, originally deployed in battalion columns, had lost most of its formation in their advance through the shrubbery and appeared as a mass of skirmishers when it emerged from the trees only 200 yards from the Pajar de Vergara's ten guns. Leval's right confronted the British portion of the line, his left the Spanish troops. The Germans facing the British tried repeatedly to advance in the face of the canister and volleys; and, when the Baden troops in the center began to fall back, the British charged. Leval's right dissolved back into the bushes, and the British captured a battery of guns that had been brought forward. The Germans facing the Spanish were also repulsed, and, seeing the rest of their division retreating, followed suit. Leval rallied his troops on his Polish regiment, having lost between 600 and 700 men in 45 minutes. Campbell's casualties numbered 236 and the Spanish no more than 180.

To the north Sherbrooke's troops had suffered through another cannonade before Lapisse and Sebastiani's Divisions began moving against them. Both divisions came on with their first line in columns of divisions and their second line in columns of battalions. The French crossed the Portina and braced for the British to fire. As opposed to the noisy way in which the French attacked, the silence of the British increased an already nerve-rattling experience, and it was not until the French were 50 yards away that Sherbrooke gave the order to fire once and then charge. The charge destroyed the French front ranks (some regiments losing a third of their men in a matter of minutes) and broke the two divisions.

But this spectacular success caused the crisis of the battle and almost led to the defeat of the Allied army. The British charge went out of control as Sherbrooke's men chased the French over the Portina. The KGL troops reached the slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal with the Guards not far behind. Only Cameron managed to halt his men on the east bank of the Portina. Now the disordered German and British came upon formed French troops; and, with no cohesion and unprotected flanks, they were easy prey. Artillery enfiladed the KGL troops, killing Langwerth. Dragoons slashed at the Guards, and the six battalions fought for their lives as they tried to reach the safety of the British lines. Cameron tried to cover the retreating masses but it was obvious that the Allied center was gone. The 2nd KGL had suffered 50% casualties, 5th KGL over 100 prisoners, and the Guards lost 611 out of 2000 men.

Wellesley reacted quickly and moved Mackenzie and the 1/48th into the Guards' old position, and had Cotton's cavalry to guard his flank. The victorious French troops came rushing towards them, and, in the firefight that ensued, Mackenzie

and Lapisse were killed, along with the 1/48th's colonel. The British suffered 632 casualties but held, and, prompted by a charge by Cotton, they forced the French to retreat. Sebastiani's troops were finished for the day. They had lost all of their colonels, 60% of their chef de battalions, 70 officers of other ranks and 2100 men. Lapisse's division was equally mauled, losing 69 officers and 1700 men.

At 4:00pm, as the fighting was at its height, Leval was ordered to attack once again to extend Sebastiani's flank. The battered Germans attacked with little enthusiasm and Campbell pushed them back even further, while the Spanish left their lines to pour a flanking fire into the retreating troops. Finally, the Regimiento del Rey charged Leval's left flank, broke them, and rode on to capture 4 French guns that had been brought up to aid the assault.

Meanwhile, things were relatively quiet on the hills. Victor, watching the developments, was content to keep up a steady cannonade that punished Hill's troops. The British pulled back over the crest, and Victor turned to his long overdue outflanking move. But in the valley north of the hills the Allied now numbered 5000 infantry and an equal number of cavalry. Still, Ruffin's wrecked regiments moved along the Sierra de Segurilla's slopes, with Cassagne's brigade of Villatte's division and Merlin's cavalry in support. As they advanced they came under artillery fire from the Medellin, and as British cavalry started to move against them they deployed into squares near the Casa de Valdefuentes

Anson's brigade charged the French, but unknown to the British a small ravine was hidden in their path. The 23rd Light Dragoons came upon the ravine and horses and men crashed into it. Some troopers managed to jump the obstacle only to face the point-blank fire from the French squares; while behind them, the German 1st Light Dragoons managed to stop short of the ravine. Both the 23rd and the Germans rallied and attacked the French squares again with little effect. Some squadrons of the 23rd, led by their colonel, charged past the squares to attack Merlin's cavalry. Merlin's front line allowed the British to pass and, completely surrounded by seasoned French cavalry, the 23rd was annihilated. Only a few officers and 2 or 3 troopers of the isolated squadrons reached safety. All in all, the 23rd had lost 207 men of 450. It was sent back to England and never served in the Peninsula again.

The French troops in the valley had seen enough and pulled back, ending the fighting. As a tragic postscript, grass fires at the foot of the Medellin burned many wounded to death before they could be pulled to safety. Although three hours of light remained, the armies were exhausted and the battle was over. Joseph refused to commit his remaining reserves to another attack, as Victor wanted. He was concerned with Venegas's threat to Madrid, and he had also received word that Soult was still far from Plasencia. Orders for a withdrawal were issued and by dusk the army was moving away to the east.

The Allies had won the battle but had suffered far greater in terms of percentage. The French had suffered 7268 casualties, and the British army had lost over 25% of its effectives, for a total of 5365 men. Spanish casualties were around 500. Wellesley, soon to be anointed Viscount Wellington for his victory, had handled his army well, seemingly everywhere at every crisis, and Cuesta had provided the necessary support without any friction. On the other hand, the French had done their best to prove Napoleon's thesis that "lions led by sheep will always be defeated by sheep led by lions".

Designer's Notes

This game is by all means a collective effort by The NBS-Team, carried out over three continents and several years and mostly by people who has never met each other face to face. A lot of things has been tried for the first (and in some cases last) time, most of them in a improvising free fall environment. It has been a pleasure (I hope) as well as a massive learning experience for all involved and as editor of the whole thing I just want to recapitulate what the main characters has done.

Jerry Malone (Boston) had the original idea for the game and did the bulk of the research as well as the graphics. His concepts for how British infantry ought to work in NBS terms found its way into a mini-game of Vimieiro by me and Stefan Ekström (Stockholm) that proved both an invaluable testbed for the Redcoats as well as a primer on how to handle work within the team. Stefan also worked on the graphics and Niek van Diepen (Nijmegen) did the losscharts. All three miraculously managed to stay sane through endless revisions. Most of these were caused by Francisco Ronco (Sevilla) and Dave Jones (Alexandria, VA) who tirelessly dug up obscure facts together with José Manuel Rodríguez Gómez (Talavera). José also led marathon playtest sessions within sight of the battlefield and came up with most of the Victory Conditions. Further playtesting as well as proofing and correcting my sloppy writing was cheerfully done by Craig Plecas, (Columbia, Md) Keith Todd (Portland, Or), Al Berke (Yokohama), Michael Bowen (Crowborough UK), Detlev Simons (Den Haag) and Geoffrey Wolfarth (Howe UK). Elias Nordling (Stockholm) helped us demonstrating the Game at Homercon and P-O Jönnson (Stockholm) printed maps for us. Me (Stockholm) put the whole thing together.

Enjoy! Anders Fager